# 1AC

#### Information secrecy IS the status quo ---- the executive has labeled themselves as the Predator Empire, operating under the framework of presumptive guilt, refusing to delineate the distinction between livelihoods of individuals and their “personalities” --- this exemplifies an unaccountable politics of purity that can cast its power, both inclusion and exclusion, to non-white communities abroad and at home

Shaw 2013 (Ian G. R. Shaw, Professor of Human Geography at the University of Glasgow, “Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare”, Geopolitics, DOI:10.1080/14650045.2012, 2013)

The Double Tap

The debate over whether or not drone strikes are a “success” is usually focused on their ability to target and eliminate “militants”. This **technological enframing** **fails to consider what** **everyday life** is

like for the broader populations that live under the drones53**.** Two recent publications are noteworthy in this respect: a 2010 report headed by Christopher Rogers of CIVIC 54, which interviewed over 160 Pakistani Civilians suffering direct losses from the U.S. strikes, and an extensive 2012 report released by The Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and the Global Justice Clinic at the New York University School of Law 55, which interviewed 130 people, including victims, witnesses, and other experts. Both reports provide firsthand testimony by those civilian populations living on the fleshy side of the disposition matrix.

Stanford and NYU’s report has four main findings. First, civilians are routinely killed, often in so-called “double tap” strikes that kill anyone that tends to the dead and wounded in the wake of an attack. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism claims that at least 50 civilians and “first responders” had been killed after they rushed to help victims of drone strikes 56. One interviewee, Hayatullah Ayoub Khan, recounted a particularly harrowing experience57. A drone missile was fired at a car around 300 meters in front of him while driving. Hayatullah exited his vehicle and slowly approached the wreckage, cautious that he might be a victim of a follow-up strike. He walked close enough to the car to see a flailing arm inside. The injured occupant “yelled that he should leave immediately because another missile would likely strike”. Hayatullah did as instructed, returning to his car just as a second missile struck the survivor. The second finding from Stanford and NYU is that beyond direct physical and monetary damage, the constant hovering of drones has lead to a deeply entrenched psychological malaise amongst civilians. Many community members now shy away from social gatherings, including important tribal meetings and funerals, with some parents even electing to keep their children away from school. Third, there is scant evidence that the strikes have made the U.S. “safer”. The “evidence suggests that US strikes have facilitated recruitment to violent non-state armed groups, and motivated further violent attacks”58. Finally, the CIA’s program of targeted killings undermines respect for, and adherence to, international law and sets a dangerous precedent.

The death of innocent people is a common theme among interviewees in both reports. CIVIC interviewed Guy Nawaz, a resident of North Waziristan who was watering his fields when he heard the screech and boom of a Hellfire: “I rushed to my house when I heard the blast. When I arrived I saw my house and my brother’s house completely destroyed and all at home were dead”59. Eleven of his family were killed, including his wife, two sons and two daughters, as well as his older brother, his wife and four children. He continued, “We were living a happy life and I didn’t have any links with the Taliban. My family members were innocent... I wonder, why was I victimized?”60 Safia lost her 30 year-old husband and 7 year-old son when a militant vehicle was struck by a drone as it passed her house. She said that “I hope the Taliban are all killed. But I hope the drone attacks are stopped immediately. They are not effective against the Taliban hideouts. USA and Pakistan should realize the fact that for the last 5-6 years the drone attacks have been taking place but no Taliban has left extremism or terrorism”61. Stories of emotional and psychological trauma were frequently recounted in both reports, with medical professionals diagnosing the **“anticipatory anxiety”** and “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” (PTSD) many civilians now suffer with. As Safdar Dawar, President of the Tribal Union of Journalists explains 62:

If I am walking in the market, I have this fear that maybe the person walking next to me is going to be a target of the drone. If I’m shopping, I’m really careful and scared. If I’m standing on the road and there is a car parked next to me, I never know if that is going to be the target. Maybe they will target the car in front of me or behind me. Even in mosques, if we’re praying, we’re worried that maybe one person who is standing with us praying is wanted. So, wherever we are, we have this fear of drones.

Both reports are an important challenge to the legitimization of drone warfare, especially in light of recent figures by a Washington Post-ABC News poll that found 83 percent of those Americans surveyed “approve” of the use of drones against suspected terrorists overseas63. The near-impossibility of travel to FATA by journalists and researchers outside or inside of Pakistan means that these reports give a rare glimpse of life on the ground. These shared stories of the women, children, and men of FATA “disturbs and disrupts the hegemonic foreign policy gaze”64, and refocuses the lens of the White House’s geographical imagination. Drone warfare in Pakistan, just like the “war on terror” more generally, is not a universal experience65: it is differentially distributed and violently uneven, split between suburban pilots that sit in air-conditioned trailers and scan video screens, adjusting their “soda straw” digital view of the world with a joystick, and the everyday experiences told by the people of FATA. While not wanting to overstate the case, these stories are important for rehumanising the abstract discourses of security strategy and the bureaucratic spaces of the disposition matrix.

[shaw continued]

**Advantage [2/\_\_]**

The Predator Empire

The Biopolitics of the Predator Empire

In this section I explore how “life” is the target for the Predator Empire. Although I do not want to downplay the role the American military plays in coordinating and performing violence across the globe, my focus is on the CIA’s **drone wars because the evidence from the NSC and DSG suggests** a diffuse (**if by no means singular**) drift towards the dronification of national security. So too does the National Counterterrorism Center’s disposition matrix and John Brennan’s “playbook”66 establish a permanent precedent for extrajudicial strikes that exist outside of Title 10 authorities67. This means that the CIA will in all likelihood remain heavily invested in targeted killings for decades to come, despite 9/11 Commission recommendations that paramilitary activities are transferred to the Department of Defense 68. The agency’s 2,000-strong Counterterrorist Center has transformed itself from an intelligence gathering machine to a major player in “kinetic operations”69. But who counts as a “target” is at times ambiguous. As I previously explored in the above NSS and NSC, there is a deliberate widening of the net surrounding who counts as an affiliate. If, as Dillon and Reid suggest, “**The history of security is a history of the** changing problematisation **of what it is to be a political subject and politically subject**”70, then the discursive baptism of the affiliate marks a new, if not unprecedented political subject. This is further complicated because affiliate are not always identifiable individuals such as an al-Qa’ida leader in North Waziristan. Instead, and as I will argue in the remainder of this section, affiliates can be threatening patterns of life that are coded, catalogued, and eliminated.

As the name directly implies, targeted killings usually involve a known target. In February 2011, John Rizzo, the 63-year-old former General Counsel of the CIA, discussed the agency’s practice of targeted killings71. Analysts and ‘targeters’ located in the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center select individuals for “neutralization” based on intelligence reports. This report must then clear a team of lawyers before it signed off by the Counsel. But this isn’t always the normal bureaucratic practice. In the summer of 2008, former CIA Director Michael Hayden successfully lobbied President Bush to dispense with drone targeting constraints that were restricted to known individuals72: “For the first time the CIA no longer had to identify its target by name; now the ‘signature’ of a typical al Qaeda motorcade, or of a group entering a known al Qaeda safe house, was enough to authorize a strike”73. The devil here is in the detail. Unlike “personality strikes”, where the person’s identity is located on one of the CIA’s classified kill lists or the disposition matrix, **a signature is constructed from** observing and cataloguing a pattern of life**—**coding the behavior and geography **of individuals; targeting their very lifeworld**. This new targeting regime may have led to a rapid escalation of drone strikes and an increase of the number of people that were killed in Pakistan. Between 2004 and 2007 there were 10 drone attacks, but between the pivot year of 2008 and 2012, this figure leapt to 333 74. In Table 1, I have calculated the percentages of militant “leaders” killed in drone strikes in order to illustrate the decreasing number of high-level “commanders” that are subject to the CIA’s strikes. While this in itself does not prove that personality strikes have given way to signature killings, it does at least suggest the widening net of those subject to drone attacks in Pakistan.

To illustrate how easily innocent civilians can get caught up in a signature strike, recall the 2010 CIVIC report once again. In one story, the Taliban visited the residence of a man named Daud Khan and demanded lunch. The father reluctantly consented, fearing reprisal if he refused the fighters: “The very next day our house was hit... My only son Khaliq was killed. I saw his body, completely burned”. In this case, it seems that Khan’s son had unwittingly become “affiliated” with the Taliban. Due to the unavoidable intermingling of such militants with the lives of ordinary people, it is likely that signature strikes could have killed many innocent people. According to the 2012 Stanford and NYU report, a signature strike probably place on March 17, 2011. The CIA fired at least two missiles into a large gathering—a jirga led by a decorated public servant—near a bus depot in the town of Datta Khel, North Waziristan. The U.S. insists that all were militants. And yet, the overwhelming evidence suggests that most of the 42 people killed were civilians 75. Of the four suspected Taliban militants identified by the Associated Press in this strike, only one has ever been identified by name. As a 2011 Washington Post report notes, “**Independent information** about who the CIA kills in signature strikes in Pakistan is **scarce**”76. Other officials in the U.S. State Department have complained that the classified criteria used by the CIA to construct a “signature” are too lax: “The joke was that when the CIA sees ‘three guys doing jumping jacks,’ the agency thinks it’s a terrorist training camp”77.

Table 1 about here Table 2 about here

Of course, drones continue to target known individuals on kill lists, performing a well-rehearsed “reduction of places and people to an abstract space”78, but at least since 2008 the Predator Empire has enforced a distinctive twist on a biopolitical logic based on targeting patterns of life. While there is much variation on what counts as biopolitics79, it was a term first coined by Michel Foucault in Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France80, a series that Chris Philo describes as the “decisive hinge” in Foucault’s “switch from being a critical historian of the body to being the critical historian of population”81. In classical theories of sovereignty, the sovereign can “either have people put to death or let them live’ 82, and its power over life “is exercised only when the sovereign can kill”83. This sovereign power became supplemented by a new “right to make live and let die”84 in the nineteenth-century. This transformation involved a shift from disciplinary technologies that targeted “man-as-body” (what Foucault calls an “anatomo-politics”) to regulatory mechanisms at the level of “man-as-species” (what Foucault calls a “biopolitics”). Biological processes such as fertility rates became political problems and sites of intervention, where the aim is was to “establish a sort of homeostasis”85 within the population which “consists in making live and letting die” and “achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers”86. All of might be termed “State control of the biological”87.

Dillon and Reid88 extend Foucault’s biopolitics of the population to a biopolitics of the molecular. They argue that as the life sciences changed over the last century, so too did the “bios” of biopolitics, becoming ever more processual, spontaneous, and based on codes (such as DNA). This “recombinant biopolitics” fed directly into the visions of Rumsfeld’s “Revolution in Military Affairs” to create a new organizing principle “concerned with surveillance and the accumulation and analysis of data concerning behaviour, the patterns which behaviour displays and the profiling of individuals within the population”89. Under this new metaphysics of power, in which “power/knowledge is very much more concerned to establish profiles, patterns and probabilities” 90, information is a weapon and securing territory is no longer viewed with the same importance as securing patterns of life.

[shaw continued]

**Advantage [3/\_\_]**

For Foucault, this means that dangerousness, what is to be secured, is no longer an actualized danger, but is located within behavioral potentialities. Or as Bruce Braun suggests, “Today, security’s principal answer to the problem of ‘unknown unknowns’ is the speculative act of pre-emption, which takes as its target potential rather than actual risks”91. Consequently, dangerous signatures or patterns of life are assessed on their very potential to become dangerous.

In the tribal areas of Pakistan, for example, most people killed by U.S. drones have not been al-Qa’ida fighters. In fact, the number of al-Qa’ida militants eliminated has been just 8% under the Obama administration92. This means that a far greater number of people who played no part in the attacks of September 11, 2001 have been vaporized by Hellfire missiles. Former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, went so far as to question whether “killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in response to [events] in 2001”93. The presumptive “guilt” of many of those killed in Pakistan today is thus constructed around the so-called “immanent” threat they pose to the U.S. Homeland: a pre-emptive, future-oriented biopolitics that exists in an exceptional space outside of centuries of international humanitarian law. These Pakistani “affiliates”—which include the Pakistan Taliban and Haqqani Network members, are part of a much wider expansion of who count as affiliates in a globalizing drone war.

The very condition that makes a biopolitics possible in the first place then—life—has become a force to be coded and secured. As Dillon describes it, “The biopolitics of security today is precisely this political emergency of emergence instituting a regime of exception grounded in the endless calibration of the infinite number of ways in which the very circulation of life threatens life rather than some existential friend/enemy distinction”94. The appearance of the affiliate in the NSS and NSC marks the emergence of a far more process-based, even epidemiological understanding of danger, where the “threat” is located in what individuals could become in the future, and security is defined as anticipating and eliminating the emergence of such danger. For Dillon, this erasure of the concept of “man” by targeting “life” means that “it is no longer adequate to judge lifelike bodies in terms of the essence of that existential otherness definite of the enemy alone, for every-body is a continuously emergent body-in-formation comprised of contingently adaptive rather than fixed properties”95. The “evental”96 nature of this “emergent emergency” helps explains the conditions surrounding the CIA’s shift in targeting practices from personality strikes to signature strikes and the changing object of national security from al-Qa’ida the organization to al-Qa’ida affiliates. In both cases the targets for the Predator Empire are not simply actualized forms of danger, but virtualized forms of emergence that may become threats in the future97.

The Spatial Topology of the Predator Empire

According to research by Nick Turse, the U.S. military operates 1,100 bases across the planet98. Many of these sites exist in shadow because they are used for paramilitary operations by Special Forces and the CIA. These bases range in size and location, but a recent and favored strategy of the U.S. military has been to construct skeletal “lily pads” that are scattered in remote outposts across the globe. Chalmers Johnson, author of the book Blowback, wrote back in 2004 that “[t]his vast network of American bases on every continent except Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire – an empire of bases with its own geography not likely to be taught in any high school geography class”99. While this “new form of empire” has been growing for decades, the proliferation of remotely piloted aircraft certainly marks a new phase in its evolution—the Predator Empire. Everywhere and nowhere, drones have become sovereign tools of life and death, where with “the lives and deaths of subjects become rights only as a result of the will of the sovereign”100.

The Predator Empire is underpinned by an expanding geography of drone bases in and around the “areas of concern” mentioned in the NSS and NSC. There are now at least 60 bases used for U.S. military and CIA drones—from medium sized Predators and Reapers to experimental systems such as the “Sentinel” that was captured by Iran. As part of their surveillance of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and Mali, U.S. drones have flown out of Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Seychelles, Niger, and many more 101. These geographic locations are intended to develop overlapping circles of surveillance. The jewel in the crown in this new form of empire is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which is sandwiched between Somalia and Yemen. This secretive 500-acre base is the first ever camp dedicated solely to tracking and eliminating al-Qa’ida and its “affiliates”102. Around 16 drones either take off or land every day at the base, which has its origins as an outpost in the French Foreign Legion. Activities at Camp Lemonnier increased in 2010 after 8 Predators were delivered, turning the camp into a fully-fledged drone base. The CIA first shipped its Predators to the camp in 2002 103, and it now acts in collaboration with the secretive Joint Special Operations Command. A total of 3,200 U.S. troops, civilians, and contractors are assigned to the camp where they “train foreign militaries, gather intelligence and dole out humanitarian aid across East Africa as part of a campaign to prevent extremists from taking root”104. In short, Camp Lemonnier is the concrete symbol of a Predator Empire no longer bound to Pakistan or Afghanistan, and expanding across the Africa.

But despite this concrete presence, the CIA’s fleet of secret drones has little interest in securing “territory” in the traditional sense, seeking instead to secure and eliminate patterns of life that threaten. In Security, Territory, Population105 Foucault details how **biopower is not exercised across territory** per se 106, but through spaces of circulation or a “milieu” of human and nonhuman multiplicities that constitute life-in-the-making. Similarly he wrote that the last domain of biopolitics is “control over relations between the human race, or human beings insofar as they are a species, insofar as they are living beings, and their environment, the milieu in which they live”107. Here, Foucault refers to both natural and manmade environments, where mastery of the environment is translated into mastery of the population. Sloterdijk goes so far as to state that “The 20th century will be remembered as the period whose decisive idea consisted in targeting not the body of the enemy, but his environment”108. Indeed, securing the atmosphere has continually transformed understandings of space, power, and sovereignty 109. The question is therefore how is the environment a biopolitical target for the Predator Empire? How is the environment understood and controlled? Unlike forms of environmental intervention that leave a gigantic “footprint” in the soil of the earth, such as the counterinsurgency pursued in Iraq, the Predator Empire pursues a **different kind of spatial biopolitics**; a virtual intervention where what is captured is not “hearts and minds” but endless streams of information that are broadcast back to the Homeland. This suggests that **the direction of power is not just an outward projection**—as with the geographic expansionism that traditionally defines “American power projection” across the globe. Rather, it also suggests an inward power collection: defined here as the power to incorporate, to bring closer.

**Advantage [4/\_\_]**

The drone continues to transform U.S. biopower by bringing distant “areas of concern” such as the tribal areas of Pakistan into the gaze of pilots, targeters, and analysts in Creetch Air Force Base in Nevada. This power to make the faraway intimate is “a non-symmetrical power topology which sometimes coincides with a geographically materialized power topology and sometimes does not”110. Predators “fold” space with an unparalleled level of aeromobility, reducing the importance that geographic distance and obstacles have in separating “there” from “here”. This power topology is not strictly exercised across space then, but rather, it is the capacity to crumple an environment by digitizing it. As Allen states, “The use of real-time technologies to create a simultaneous presence in a diversity of settings is, for instance, just one way in which relations of presence and absence may be reconfigured so that the gap between ‘here and there’ is bridged relationally, and distance itself is no longer understood simply as a metric”111. The 2012 DSG makes it clear that physical boots on the ground are not part of the strategic environment of the future. The Predator Empire therefore marks the continuing evolution from a reliance on a topographic, ground-intensive empire to a topological, aerial empire. Airpower and aeromobilities has always been a central tenet of U.S. military strategy of course. As Adey summarizes, “From the air raids of the Blitz to the newest unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, aeromobilities provide both promise and possibility, as well as dread, terror, destruction and death’112. And while it is undeniable that the CIA’s ghost war requires an expanding network of drone bases, such a Droneworld is not the end point of power—it is the architecture for the coding, cataloging, and eliminating of life in “real time”, on a scale that is historically unprecedented. It is within the unique topological spatiality of the Predator Empire that targeting killings become ever more decentralized across the planet, even as the power to take life is centralized in the hands of the executive branch of government.

When Obama stated that “We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense” in his inaugural address, he appealed to a biopolitics that is the hallmark of our geopolitical condition. The distinctiveness and coherence of “friend” and “enemy” has seemingly melted away into more amorphous patterns of life that are located across Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. Although Foucault goes to create lengths detailing how biological life is included in politics, and how technologies exist “to control the series of random events that can occur in a living mass”113, he also asks how ‘is it possible for a political power to kill, to call for deaths, to demand deaths, to give the order to kill...? 114 He answers quite specifically with racism as “the precondition for exercising the right to kill”115. Certainly, the Pashtun residents in the tribal areas of Pakistan are caught in a net of violent colonial language116 and laws117 inherited from the British Raj. But such violence must constantly be performed and is thus reliant on the technologies and spatialities of state power 118. The civilians living and dying in Pakistan, whose families and friends were interviewed in the 2010 CIVIC report and the 2012 Stanford and New York University report, are exposed to an unaccountable surveillance apparatus that scrutinizes their patterns of life from thousands of miles away. Their vulnerability is inseparable from the topological spatial power of the Predator Empire.

#### Lee and I take a position that the United States federal government should statutorily restrict the Executive’s war power authority by prohibiting any targeted killings.

**Advantage [5/\_\_]**

#### This network of secrecy precludes an effective debate about drones --- engaging the policy-intricacies of executive drone power is anti-thetical to patting oneself on their back, and in the context of the topic the affirmative is necessary to bring to discussion debates that happen in closed doors ---- our affirmative is a form of informing an increasingly disconnected public about the spread of drones --- our 1AC provides a heuristic for discussing how racist and xenophobic policies are conducted by law enforcement

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Conclusions

By introducing the term Predator Empire I do not want to suggest that U.S. extrajudicial killings are in any way “new”. Rather, I want to show how U.S. national security strategy is transforming alongside the rise of the drone; creating the geopolitical conditions for a permanent war waged from the heart of Washington D.C. The Predator, manufactured by General Atomics, was the first drone used by the U.S. for a targeted killing in Afghanistan in 2002. Since then, the CIA’s model of extrajudicial assassination has moved from the periphery to the center of a dronified form of state violence. This is a battle that is spearheaded by bureaucrats and White House officials that wear suits rather than uniforms, and wage war with spreadsheets rather than rifles. It is a different kind of empire, one in which U.S. bases resemble outposts like Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. This shift is encapsulated in the 2011 National Counterterrorism Strategy and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. These documents mobilize an amorphous “everywhere war”119 against vaguely defined “affiliates”. Of course, the “war on terror” has always been a type of governmentality 120 that inserts itself into the population, whether at airports, borders 121, or other security checkpoints, where biometric scanning segregates “legitimate mobilities” from “illegitimate mobilities”122. The CIA’s signature **strikes extend and rework this form of algorithmic calculation to target threatening patterns of life**. And this is realized by a topological power that folds the spaces of the affiliate into the surveillance machinery of the Homeland.

The Predator Empire thus marks the continuation of biopolitics by other means—namely an aerial ghost war that is central to U.S. national security. These targeted killings represent the crystallization of what could be called America’s “one percent war”: **a war that only affects around one percent of the U.S. population: those profiting in the military-industrial complex and those pilots sitting in cubicles staring at “Death TV”.** The other 99 percent remain alienated from a nebulous and permanent war waged by robots in the borderlands of the planet. This has the effect of creating two geographic and imaginary distances: **between drone pilots and their targets**, and between the **Predator Empire and the public**. And with so much of the violence performed by the CIA’s paramilitary wing, an official [refusal to acknowledge] ~~silence~~ drowns out any murmurings that surface in an otherwise subdued Congress. So too does the replacement of human troops with robotic warriors reduce the threshold of going to war. Beginning on April 23rd, 2011, American drones began six months of strikes against Qaddafi’s faltering regime in Libya. Crucially they were not authorized by the so-called Congressional “War Powers Resolution” designed to curb executive power. Peter Singer writes that “Choosing to make the operation [robotic] ~~unmanned~~ proved critical to initiating it without Congressional authorization”, adding “Like it or not, the new standard we’ve established ... is that presidents need to seek approval only for operations that send people into harm’s way — not for those that involve waging war by other means”125.

Looking forward, the consequences of this dronification of state violence are only coming into focus, although I think three outcomes are almost certain. First of all, consider “drone creep”: the use of drones in everyday settings by the police and other civilian agencies. One of the biggest trends in recent years has been the adoption of drone technology for law enforcement, particularly within the U.S. where Predator drones are used by Customs and Border Patrol along the borders with Mexico and Canada. And at the end of 2011, U.S. police in North Dakota made their first arrest with the aid of a Predator drone. This type of police surveillance is set to increase after the recent passage of The Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act in 2012.

This expansion feeds into a wider drone “arms race” across the globe. In 2012 the Government Accountability Office revealed that over 75 countries have now acquired some form of drone, with the U.S. and Israel remaining the global export leaders.

Perhaps the emergence of drone-on-drone warfare is just around the corner; after all, there is no shortage of political will, nor is there a shortage of non-state actors that will redefine the rules of the game.

[shaw continued]

**Advantage [6/\_\_]**

[shaw continued]

Second, in the hunt for affiliates in FATA, the CIA’s drone strikes continue to alienate the larger Pakistani population127. Tom Engelhardt describes drones as “blowback weapons” with Nick Turse adding: “Over the last decade, a more-is-better mentality has led to increased numbers of drones, drone bases, drone pilots, and drone victims, but not much else. Drones may be effective in terms of generating body counts, but they appear to be even more successful in generating animosity and creating enemies”128. Even if al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have indeed “metastasized” across Africa, moving from the tribal areas of Pakistan to new fronts in Somalia, Yemen, and the Sahel, this geographic shift must be seen as the inevitable outcome of an expanding Predator Empire. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst and Obama counterterrorism adviser was blunt in his diagnosis of targeted killings: “The problem with the drone is it’s like your lawn mower. You’ve got to mow the lawn all the time. The minute you stop mowing, the grass is going to grow back”129. But perhaps this is the very point: blowback sustains a permanent war.

Third, the Predator Empire will continue to violate national sovereignty on a number of fronts, as the technology challenges the very sanctity of territory 130. Indeed, it is difficult to keep track of an expanding battlespace spreads horizontally across Africa, and vertically into the earth's upper atmospheres. Furthermore, the drone war appears to be in direct contravention of international humanitarian law on numerous fronts131. U.S. strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya have all taken place in the shadow of law, and set a dangerous precedent that will no doubt be emulated across the globe by a range of state and non-state actors. Indeed, the legal violations of the Predator Empire are mirrored in its territorial violations: both are locked together in a legal-lethal space132. Perhaps the significance held by ground bases, such as Camp Lemonnier, will begin to erode as aircraft carriers enjoy a renewed importance as the Predator Empire migrates along the Pacific Ocean towards China133. Drones are under development by the U.S. Navy that can take off and land autonomously from a carrier. This, combined with increasing developments in “swarm” technology, as well as an escalation of Special Operations forces, sets the stage for a world in which a highly mobile force, answerable only to the executive branch, can drop down from the sky at a minute’s notice—sometimes with a kick at the door, other times with a Hellfire.

While the Predator Empire may be assembled with dozens rather than hundreds of flight orbits, it is essential that the wholesale psychological damage that is being wrought upon thousands of people is never eclipsed by a technological enframing that so often shields the unbearable humanity of it all. Targeted killings are quickly becoming a “post-political” background issue and a noise that few listen to. This is why the civilian voices from Pakistan and elsewhere need to be heard, since they signify the fundamental "worldly" damage caused by drone strikes, well beyond the "surgical" metaphors that circulate in official state narratives. Indeed, Washington’s permanent war is not even an ethical issue for most of the public: it is simply “common sense” to use Predators to solve problems. An intervention is therefore needed to reposition what counts as human security away from this entrenched logic of “death-as-success".

**Advantage [7/\_\_]**

#### The devils are in the details --- understanding details about policy is critical for us to better debate about the implications of unaccountable profiling and introduction of violence --- it can help us create a community of acknowledgement which is key

Hughes 2012 (Evin, Georgia Southern Univ. [Float Like a Plane, Sting Like a Bomb: The Ethics of US Drone Attacks](http://nmcenter.org/attachments/awards_pieces/19/The_Ethics_of_US_Drone_Attacks.docx) [www.ncte.org/library/NCTEFiles/About/Awards/.../Hughes\_Evin.pdf](http://www.ncte.org/library/NCTEFiles/About/Awards/.../Hughes_Evin.pdf). edited for gendered/able-ist language)

What Ali was able to do through his nonviolent rhetoric that is still relevant to this day was successfully make millions of people “bear witness” to the violence and irrationality of war. For example, say you are watching the news with a roommate and the news anchor, within her nicely lit and air conditioned studio, talks in a monotone about the deaths of civilians in a Pakistani market by a drone strike, and your roommate immediately changes the channel, not giving the terrible story another thought. Your roommate doesn’t understand the gravity of that devastation any more than the news anchor does; neither understands the significant socio-economical problems that the drone strike has caused in that area. How about the [person] sitting behind the joystick, the Nintendo-war-controller, pressing the buttons to release the Hellfire missiles like Mario firing at Bowser? Though the drone operator of all people probably knows the extent of the devastation [they are] causing, [they refuse] to think about it, [they hide] the truth from [them]selves. The drone “pilot,” the unenthusiastic anchor, your roommate—they are all complicit. Shoshana Felman, influential in raising issues connected with Holocaust testimony and what is called the “crisis of witnessing,” says that those that misunderstand or hide what they see are unable to take that information and “translate…[it]…spontaneously and simultaneously into meaning” (Felman 212). Famous psychologists Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan described this as disavowal—a defense mechanism in which a person refuses to recognize the reality of a traumatic perception (Evans 44). Through speeches recited on college campuses, Ali urged thousands of students to bear witness to the problems of integration and segregation, hate, and the Vietnam War. In one such speech, he links the violence in Vietnam caused by the war to the violence in the states; he stated that he would rather fight what was going on in a legal way. Not by war in a foreign country, but by nonviolent resistance right here in the United States. “Whatever the punishment, whatever the persecution is for standing up for my beliefs, even if it means facing machine-gun fire that day, I’ll face it…” (Hauser 187). Through 6 this speech, Ali led as example to all those students in the crowd, to all those seeing and not choosing to accept reality, to all those in disavowal. What Felman proposes is a community of [acknowledgement] ~~seeing~~: a space into which “we can bring into consciousness what is unconscious in us”—like the college auditoriums and classrooms where Ali conducted his speeches—to analyze and make sense of events as a community (Amy 67). It is the very nature of the violence of the “war on terror” that does not allow a community of [acknowledgement] ~~seeing~~. The media-attack on these countries by ingratiating news anchors take the American people and place them onto a platform where they are unable to reach a community of seeing, unable to argue the ethics of this war. We are divided, separated from the truth. Democratic representatives John Conyers, Dennis Kuncinich and many more, were calling for a truth as a community of officials when they wrote letters to the president demanding for him to publicly release the criteria on which be would elect people to be attacked by drones on his infamous kill list (Heuvel)—there has been no more coverage of the letters in the media. Unless we become conscious as a community of the truth of the violence we are creating, unless we bear witness and develop a community of seeing, we are doomed to be “locked into violences we cannot escape” (Amy 69).

**Advantage [8/\_\_]**

#### The refusal to deliberate over drone policy risks public apathy because of the invisible nature of drone warfare ---- the affirmative brings an opportunity to re-engage the public to challenge presidential action

Druck 2012 [Judah A. Druck, law associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Cornell Law School graduate, magna cum laude graduate from Brandeis University, “Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare,” <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf>]

The practical effects of this move toward a technology-driven, and¶ therefore limited, proxy style of warfare are mixed. On the one hand,¶ the removal of American soldiers from harm’s way is a clear benefit,124¶ as is the reduced harm to the American public in general. For that,¶ we should be thankful. But there is another effect that is less easy to¶ identify: public apathy. By increasing the use of robotics and decreasing the probability of harm to American soldiers, modern warfare has¶ “affect[ed] the way the public views and perceives war” by turning it¶ into “the equivalent of sports fans watching war, rather than citizens¶ sharing in its importance.”125 As a result, the American public has¶ slowly fallen victim to the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare; when the risks of harm to American soldiers abroad and civilians¶ at home are diminished, so too is the public’s level of interest in foreign military policy.126¶ In the political sphere, this effect snowballs into both an uncaring¶ public not able (or willing) to effectively mobilize in order to challenge presidential action and enforce the WPR, and a Congress whose¶ own willingness to check presidential military action is heavily tied to¶ public opinion.127 Recall, for example, the case of the Mayaguez,¶ where potentially unconstitutional action went unchecked because¶ the mission was perceived to be a success.128 Yet we can imagine that¶ most missions involving drone strikes will be “successful” in the eyes of the public: even if a strike misses a target, the only “loss” one needs to¶ worry about is the cost of a wasted missile, and the ease of deploying¶ another drone would likely provide a quick remedy. Given the political risks associated with making critical statements about military action, especially if that action results in success,129 we can expect even¶ less congressional WPR enforcement as more military engagements¶ are supported (or, at the very least, ignored) by the public. In this¶ respect, the political reaction to the Mayaguez seems to provide an example of the rule, rather than the exception, in gauging political reactions within a technology-driven warfare regime.¶ Thus, when the public becomes more apathetic about foreign affairs as a result of the limited harms associated with technology-driven¶ warfare, and Congress’s incentive to act consequently diminishes, the¶ President is freed from any possible WPR constraints we might expect¶ him to face, regardless of any potential legal issues.130 Perhaps unsurprisingly, nearly all of the constitutionally problematic conflicts carried out by presidents involved smaller-scale military actions, rarely¶ totaling more than a few thousand troops in direct contact with hostile forces.131 Conversely, conflicts that have included larger forces,¶ which likely provided sufficient incentive for public scrutiny, have¶ generally complied with domestic law.132¶ The result is that as wars become more limited,133 unilateral presidential action will likely become even more unchecked as the triggers¶ for WPR enforcement fade away. In contrast with the social and political backlash witnessed during the Civil War, World War I, the Vietnam¶ War, and the Iraq War, contemporary military actions provide insufficient incentive to prevent something as innocuous and limited as a¶ drone strike. Simply put, technology-driven warfare is not conducive¶ to the formation of a substantial check on presidential action.134

**Advantage [9/\_\_]**

#### Engaging in the political sciences to create solutions for drones helps us learn about the details and clarifies the solutions necessary

Omar Bashir writes on “How to Improve the Drones Debate” in 2012 (Omar, Princeton PhD candidate. How to Improve the Drones Debate http://themonkeycage.org/2012/11/15/how-to-improve-the-drones-debate/)

Most news articles about drones cover some new development, claim to raise new ethical questions, and mention superficially the need for greater transparency and/or accountability. Specific recommendations for change are rare or rarely helpful ([this](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-drone-war-demands-accountability/2012/11/01/56627964-2380-11e2-8448-81b1ce7d6978_story_1.html) recent editorial calls for strikes to be subject to congressional review, but they [already are](http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/25/nation/la-na-drone-oversight-20120625)). There may be an opportunity for political scientists to contribute by formulating and floating ideas about safeguards that address pressing ethical concerns. For example, it is common to hear calls for the introduction of oversight to drone campaigns. Political scientists generally have a good sense of which proposed institutional arrangements might provide successful oversight because we are trained to consider issues like incentive compatibility. Further, we’re likely to have knowledge of oversight institutions at work in other countries that might be emulated. My own [proposal](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138141/omar-s-bashir/who-watches-the-drones) is based on adaptation of the UK’s system of independent review for terrorism legislation. I think it addresses the single most important ethical issue regarding drone strikes: we have no way of knowing whether or not the U.S. government is acting in accordance with the requirements of necessity, discrimination, and proportionality. Inconsistent studies of post-strike damage have not settled the issue, and we can’t simply take the Obama administration at its word. Instead, the government needs something beyond existing congressional review to demonstrate credibly to audiences at home and abroad that too many civilians are not dying compared to the threat posed by targets and to show that there is appropriate cause for deeming individuals targetable. This oversight, which can ideally provide some indication when strikes begin to violate the requirement of proportionality, may be the key to preventing “endless war”: it might help us know when, if not already, campaigns have taken out so many targets that further killing cannot be justified. Clinton Watts and Frank Cilluffo propose another tangible solution that has a chance of being acceptable both to government and human rights advocates. Their idea is based on the modification of an existing American institution, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court; it is covered in [this](http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=813) post. If you are aware of other proposals, please link them in the comments, and feel free to post your own ideas.

#### Debating about the intricacies about drone policy is that first step

Ishaan Tharoor writes about “The Debate on Drones” in 2013 that (Ishaan, writer for Times. The Debate on Drones: Away from the Politics, the Nameless Dead Remain Read more: <http://world.time.com/2013/02/08/the-debate-on-drones-away-from-the-politics-the-nameless-dead-remain/#ixzz2c3KKvqQS>)

What complicates those hundreds of civilian deaths is the official silence that surrounds them. The U.S. government has so far refused to publicly recognize its culpability in what are clandestine missions away from the Afghan theater of operations, while its Pakistani counterparts, who to an extent allowed and abetted the CIA’s drone program, would rather not own up to their own tacit role in supporting many of the strikes. “Both sides are trapped in their own double-dealing,” writes Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid in his new book, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. “The Americans cannot discuss drones, because they are a classified CIA operation, while Pakistan pretends it never sanctioned the drones or provided intelligence to the United States, for fear of riling up the militants.” The awkward geopolitical pas de deux leaves the victims of drone strikes and their families in the dark. Some rights groups and activists have already started collecting testimony from villagers in places like North and South Waziristan. The aforementioned London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism announced Thursday [a project to determine the names](http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/02/04/naming-the-dead-bureau-announces-new-drones-project/) of as many of the reported fatalities of drone strikes in Pakistan as possible. The endeavor will be a difficult one, not least because it will require prying information out of U.S. and Pakistani officials. “In the face of official secrecy, having the full facts about who is killed is essential for an informed debate about the effectiveness and ethics of the drone campaign,” said Christopher Hird, managing editor of the Bureau, in a statement posted on its website. [An editorial](http://dawn.com/2013/02/07/not-credible-enough/) the same day in the prominent Pakistani daily Dawn, concurred: “More information is needed to convince both Americans and Pakistanis that their civil liberties are not being eroded in the name of their security.” The more we learn about drones, the more we should know about who they kill.

# 2AC

### Ablism

#### Rejection of particular terms locks them into place

Butler ‘97

(Judith Butler Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature – University of California-Berkeley 1997 Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative p. 38)

**Keeping** such **terms unsaid and unsayable can also work to lock them in place,** preserving their power to injure, and **arresting the possibility of a reworking that might shift their context and purpose. That such language carries trauma is not a reason to forbid its use. There is no** purifying language of its traumatic residue, and no way **to work through trauma except through the arduous effort it takes to direct the course of its repetition.** It may be chat trauma constitutes a strange kind of resource, and repetition, its vexed but promising instrument. After all, to be rained by another is traumatic: it is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might then begin to exercise agency at all. **A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life.** This is what I have been called. Because I have been called something, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. The terms by which we are hailed arc rarely the ones we choose (and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); **but these terms we never really choose are the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open.**

#### Language is reversible – The introduction of injurious language simultaneously introduces the prospect of contestation – Their erasure avoids the prospect of contestation

**Butler 97** Judith Butler, 1997, EXCITABLE SPEECH- politics of speech, ,KL

One is not simply fixed by the name that one is called. In being called an injurious name, one is derogated and demeaned. But the name holds out another possibility as well: by being called a name, one is also, paradaoxically, given a certain possibility for social existence, initiated into a temporal life of language that exceeds the prior purposes that animate that call. Thus the injurious address may appear to fix or paralyze the one it hails, but it may also produce an unexpected and enabling response. If to be addressed is to be interpellated, then the offensive call runs the risk of inaugurating a subject in speech who comes to use language to counter the offensive call. When the address is injurious, it works its force upon the one in injures.

1. **The claim that ableism can be described as ONE GROUP ALL CHALLENGING oppression ignores the oppression within anti-ableist communities**

**Humphrey, 2k**

(Jill C. Faculty of applied social science @ the Open University, Researching disability politics, or, some problems with the social model in practice, Disability & Society 15.1)

The medical model posited an essentialist conception of impairment, elaborated complex typologies of diagnoses and treatments, and erased the experiences of disabled people from the medical map. The social model sequesters impairment from disability and vests control of the latter in disabled people themselves. **Dis­abled people are ipso facto in a privileged ontological and epistemological position in relation to disability**, insofar as they know when they encounter disabling societal barriers, and it is their experiential knowledges which should guide all debates on why society is disabling and how to erase disablism from the social map. The proliferation of groups run by and for disabled people—in the service of practical and social support, as well as cultural and political pursuits—suggests that they are rapidly consolidating themselves into an ethnos. This is a term used by Anthias & Yuval-Davis (1992) to denote a distinct people with a distinct culture, although this should be understood in social constructionist, rather than essentialist terms—a collectivity is not a pre-given essence, but rather only exists to the extent that its members demarcate criteria of inclusion and exclusion as part of their reflexive appropriation of their identity and heritage. **The boundaries of any given community are in this sense 'artificial' constructs, and therefore contestable and changeable.** **The disability community has already made enormous efforts in recognising its own heterogeneity** and in accommodating to those with multiple identities—hence, the sub-groups for disabled black and/or Asian people (e.g. Priestley, 1995) and those for disabled gay and/or lesbian people (e.g. Shakespeare et al.t 1996). This is a positive development in terms of under­standing the multifaceted nature of identities and oppressions (see Vernon, 1999), and the variegated impacts of policies and practices (see Drake, 1999). It may become problematic if such sub-groups **splinter apart from the main movement(s) which gave birth to them, or if they** prioritise one aspect **of their identity or oppression** above another, as indicated by Vernon (1999). However, **there is another boundary problem which is arguably more germane to the disability community, since it pertains to the boundaries of disability itself**. From the 'inside'**,** there are **deaf** people who are classified as disabled **in legislation and by society,** but who repudiate the disabled identity **on the grounds that they constitute a distinct linguistic and cultural minority** (e.g. Harris, 1995). **There are also people who are coming to see themselves as disabled in spite of not being recognised as disabled in official or traditional discourses**—hence, the thought-provoking question from Cooper (1997) **'Can a fat woman call herself disabled?**' There is **also** a potentially **vast, but largely untapped liminal** space inhabited by people who have journeyed from **a** disabled to a non-disabled identity and sometimes back again, and **by** those whose disabilitiesare hidden **from the gaze of others** (cf. French, 1993; Druckett, 1998). The UNISON group is grounded upon the principle that **anyone who self-defines as disabled is disabled** and is therefore eligible to join the disabled members group. In theory, this seems to be a self-evident truism; **in practice, it may well 'work' for many people;** to articulate an alternative maxim would be inconceivable and, I would argue, undesirable. **Nevertheless**, during the course of the research project I was led, unexpectedly, to **problematise this maxim**. First, **it transpires that there is an element of compulsion in adopting a disabled identity**, which may be one aspect of what Shakespeare (1997) has dubbed the ' "Maoism" in the Movement'. Many **members** of the UNISON group **refuse to accept the self-definitions of deaf members as 'deaf not disabled'**, insisting that they are deaf and disabled, or indeed that they are first and foremost disabled, and only secondarily deaf. Moreover, one interviewee who worked in a voluntary agency run by and for disabled people claimed that their policy was to refer to all service-users as disabled people, regardless of the fact that many service-users repudiated this label. Whilst some did not regard themselves as 'disabled', others continued to use 'inappropriate' termi­nology to refer to their impairments, such as 'handicapped', and here the social model was deployed to over-ride self-definitions. **The danger here is that** the political principles of more powerful disabled actors can be prioritised over the personal perceptions of less powerful disabled actors **until the principle of self-definition lapses into self-contradiction**: DW [W]e work with a **lot of disabled people who are not interested in the social model or anything like that**. What we've said is we won't use the language they've asked us to use about them—we'll just call them their name—it's not that difficult—you don't have to refer to that language necessarily, because you have to hold on to your principles as well. Second, **we can witness the *silencing* of impairments, as impairment is relegated to a clandestine and privatised space**, **an effect** which Hughes & Paterson (1997) have **attributed to the social model, and its dualism between impairment and disability**. Whilst some interviewees were explicit about their impairments, these were people with apparent impairments in any event. One interlocutor enshrouded her impair­ments in layers of secrecy so that after 2 hours of otherwise frank and detailed dialogues I was still bemused as to which impairments she had experienced. Whilst I was led to believe that different impairments had impacted differently upon her career in workplaces, trade unions and civil rights politics, the discursive absence around impairments in their specificity prevented me from developing an accurate or adequate understanding of her narrative: JCH: I find it interesting that you had, like, an invisible impairment that became, kind of, visible— DW: No, that was a *different thing.* JCH: Oh, that was a *different* thing—right. W: So then I was diagnosed as having something completely different. I've still got *this other things* but at the moment it's not so visible. (Emphases added.) At the time, my concerns that explicit interrogations could become oppressive intrusions meant that I accepted the veil of ignorance and castigated myself for my curiosity. Subsequently, I discovered that it was not just 'outsiders' who could be perplexed by these 'impairments with no name'. A blind man discussed his frus­tration with other disability activists who challenged his inquiries as to the nature of their impairments—his standard reply was that it was an access issue not only for him, in virtue of his blindness, but also for them, in virtue of his role as a service-provider and access advisor. At the same time, this interviewee exhibited a more general awareness that both disability politics and disability theory had been dominated by people with particular disability identities like his own: DM: It's very convenient for people with apparent disabilities **or impair­ments** to operate a social model which says. 'We don't want to discuss things in terms of 'impairments'**. Because these people have got priority anyway, and impairment-related provision** [in UNISONJ ... **The trouble with** it [**the social model] is that it's very difficult** ... **for people with learning difficulties or other conditions ... which are not catered for ... to raise their concerns as things which need dealing with on a service level, without feeling that they're *breaking the law* and *talking about impairments.*** Third, **the right to self-define as disabled has as its logical corollary the duty to accept others' self-definitions, but suspicions that people are not who they claim to be circulate around the disabled community** in UNISON. Casting aspersions upon the purported disability of other group members in veiled or outright manners, with or without names attached, arose spontaneously during interviews. In my naivete, I neither comprehended nor challenged this at the time, but from re-reading and de-coding interview transcripts, I can discern three themes as follows: a self-defined disabled person may be suspected of not being disabled when they harbour a non-apparent impairment, and/or express views which diverge from the prevailing consensus, and/or simultaneously belong to one of the other self-organised groups. **These themes**, in turn, **suggest the operation of hierarchies of impairments, ortho­doxies and oppressions,** respectively. **This is a strange juncture, where** the propensity to treat **only** tangible impairmentsas evidence of a bona fide disability identity clearly marginalises those with non-apparent impairments, such as learning or mental health ones**, whilst the reluctance or refusal to differentiate between impairments by identifying them bolsters up the claims by people with apparent impairments that they represent all disabled people**. The twist in the tale is that **when other disabled people do become visible and audible in interrogating the hierarchy of impairments. they may find themselves once again marginalised as the other hierarchies of orthodoxies and oppressions come into play**. For one thing, **people with learning or mental health difficulties may speak with a different voice, given the qualitatively different *stigmata* attached to different impairments and given the fact that the social model has been developed by those with physical impairments, so that their contributions may be interpreted as deviating from prevailing orthodoxies**. For another, people who belong to another oppressed group may be all too visible in their difference, but their blackness or gayness may be construed as detracting from their contributions as disability activists**, given the propensities of each group to prioritise its own specific identification-discrimination nexus**. The following intervie­wee testifies to some of these dynamics: DM: People have *the right to self-define.* But what we've never said is who has got *the right to challenge.* So if somebody says 'I'm a disabled person; I've come to this disability group' I don't know how you can deal with your *suspicion that they're not.* In fact you *can't* deal with it. And you have to ask yourself why you *want* to deal with it ... [names mentionedj ... But I'm absolutely convinced that **there are lots of people who *don't* come to groups because they're frightened that they don't *look* disabled enough.** Indeed, **this hierarchy of impairments and this 'policing' of the disability identity does act to exclude** UNISON **members who believe that they experience the disabling effects of an impairment, but who suspect that they would not 'count' as disabled people according to the prevailing criteria in the disabled members' group**. Evidence for this emerged during a detailed case-study of the lesbian and gay group, and two examples should suffice. The first example is of a lesbian who had been dyslexic since childhood, who had experienced a range of discriminations in edu­cation, employment and everyday life, and who was registered as disabled with the Department of Employment. She sought to engage in her local disabled members' group, but disengaged after the first meeting: DL: I'm also disabled with an invisible disability, dyslexia ... I have to educate people about dyslexia as well ... An invisible disability is very difficult for people to cope with—you have to tell each new person, and then they each interpret it differently, and then they can forget ... And it's a fluid disability as well—it's manageable sometimes and unmanageable other times ... and people can't deal with that either ...' JCH: Did you ever go to the disabled members' group? DL: I did. And I got *stared at* when I walked in. By people who really should know better. JCH: Sorry. Why did you get stared at? This is not obvious to me! DL: Because I didn't *look* like I was disabled. The second example is, perhaps paradoxically, someone whose impairment was visible, but who dared not join the disabled members' group on the grounds that it was not 'severe' enough to be taken seriously by other group members. The impairment in question was skin allergies over her entire body, including facial disfigurement which is recognised under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, as one of its few token gestures towards the social model of disability (Hqual Opportu­nities Review, 1996). Nevertheless, this interviewee's self-definition as disabled was confounded and then crushed by her convictions that disability activists would define her as non-disabled: DL: 'I get quite *bitter* sometimes. I don't think I'm disabled, because I don't think that what I've got prevents me from functioning, or society doesn't prevent me from functioning. But it probably *does* ... And my skin tissue scars very easily, and I've got visible marks on my face, and people *do* look, and I *do* feel conscious of it, and I'm *made* to feel conscious of it. But I would feel like I was—what's the word?—an *impostor* if I attended a disability caucus for those reasons. I feel that the disability caucus excludes people like that ... Nobody takes things like that into account. JCH: The crazy thing is, that until people like you get involved in the disability movement in the union, then they *won't take* things like that into account! But that does put a big burden on *you*—or on people in your position—to come out and say 'Hey! We're here too! What about us?' DL: But I feel like mine is a *minimal* complication. Or whether I'm *made* to feel that way ...? The argument here is that **the social model as operationalised** within the UNISON group **has both reified the disability identity and reduced it to particular kinds of impairments—physical, immutable, tangible and 'severe' ones—in a way which can deter many people from adopting a disabled identity and participating in a disability community.** Whilst this indicates that the social model may harbour its own set of indigenous essentialisms and exclusions, the solution is not to capitulate to the other-imposed essentialisms and exclusions of the medical model, but rather to work towards a more inclusive model. This will entail a more welcoming stance towards all those who self-define as disabled whatever their impairment might be and towards those who experience impairments and who want to combat discrimina­tions, but who do not choose to identify as 'disabled' for whatever reason. It is time for people to ask 'What do we mean by "our" community? Are its building-blocks safe or its boundaries sensible?' There may be merit in reflecting upon Young's (1990a) warning that **communities are often fabricated out of the yearning to be among similar-and-symmetrical selves, to the point where members respond to alterity by expelling it beyond their border**. Clearly, a self-perpetuating spiral can be set in motion, whereby the tighter the boundaries are drawn, the more those included will normalise their sameness and exclude others, **the more the excluded will become estranged others, and the less the community will be informed by experiences of and reflection upon diversity**, etc. This should not be misread—the UNISON group, like many other disabled people's organisations, is at least as democratic as any other social or political group in its constitution, and it is at least as diverse as any other in respecting multiple identities. Paradoxically, some disabled people's organisations may have expended more energies in reaching out to black and gay people who harbour specific impairments than in reaching out to differently disabled people whatever their other oppressions. Of course, we must do both. But the question 'Who is to "count" as a member of the disability community**?' is not as strange as it may sound and** may **even** be the Achilles heel of disability politics **to date.**

### AT: Drone Focus Bad

#### ---No link and turn --- Focusing on drones doesn’t preclude criticisms of targeted killing policy and is a critical prerequisite to the alternative.

Noble July 19th 2012

Doug, activist with Occupy Rochester NY and Rochester Against War, Assassination Nation: Fifty Years of US Targeted ‘Kill Lists’: From the Phoenix Program to Predator Drones, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article31925.htm

The purpose of this article is to reframe the current attention on killer drones and Obama’s “kill list” within an historical perspective. The goal here is not to discourage the escalating protest against killer drones or against Obama’s targeted assassination program around the globe. As stated at the outset, the unprecedented visibility of these nefarious activities and of the outraged public response to them is precisely what is needed at this time. This heightened awareness also affords a perfect opportunity to revisit the extraordinary history of US assassination and targeted killing that has led directly and explicitly to these activities.

### 2AC- Speaking

#### Political activism in debate allows *new* political views and activism- empirical data proves

Madestam ’13 (Andreas Madestam, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger, David Yanagizawa-Drott, Aug 2013 in Quarterly Journal of Economics, <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/09/30/qje.qjt021.full>, August 11, 2013

Instead, because the effects are very much local, they suggest that personal interaction within small groups of citizens serves as a crucial channel for the transmission of new political views and that leads to increases in political activism, in line with [Zuckerman’s (2005)](http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/09/30/qje.qjt021.full#ref-52) “social logic of politics” and the shaping of a new social context that motivates citizens to “call folk, hustle, [and] outwork [their] foe” ([Texans for John Cornyn 2008](http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/09/30/qje.qjt021.full#ref-49)). In our discussion we argue that Lohmann’s information-driven model of the effectiveness of political activism cannot fully explain our results and that social networks, mobilization, and/or habit formation are key missing elements that must be incorporated into a full model of political protests. This argument is broadly consistent with the qualitative evidence presented by [Skocpol and Williamson (2011)](http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/09/30/qje.qjt021.full#ref-46). In their study of the Tea Party movement, based on interviews with activists and an analysis of their (online) activity, they emphasize the role rallies played in shaping the movement: “From interviews and tracking local Tea Parties in public sources, we have learned that these groups were often launched by sets of organizers who did not know one another personally before they met in rallies or other protest settings” ([Skocpol and Williamson 2011](http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/09/30/qje.qjt021.full#ref-46): 93). These local groups then helped sustain the momentum of the movement through regular meetings and grassroots organizing, often but not always facilitated by individual members’ previous experience in other mediating institutions ([Skocpol and Williamson 2011](http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/09/30/qje.qjt021.full#ref-46): 37–44), which could be seen as analogous to the value of preexisting institutions to the civil rights movement in its heyday ([McAdam 1985](http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/09/30/qje.qjt021.full#ref-37)). We argue that through this mechanism, and not solely through the revelation of privately held, preexisting policy views, initial rally turnout affected political and policy outcomes for the rest of the election cycle. Personal interaction is, after all, a highly effective campaign instrument ([Green and Gerber 2008](http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/09/30/qje.qjt021.full#ref-24)).

### AT: CIA Circumvention

#### Congressional pressure solves CIA compliance

**Shah et al ‘12** [Naureen Shah, ¶ Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism ¶ and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, Rashmi Chopra, ¶ J.D. ‘13, Janine Morna, J.D. ‘12, Chantal Grut, L.L.M. ‘12, Emily Howie, L.L.M. ‘12, Daniel Mule, ¶ J.D. ‘13, Zoe Hutchinson, L.L.M. ‘12, Max Abbott, J.D. ‘12.¶ Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of Center for Civilians in Conflict, led staff from the ¶ Center in conceptualization of the report, and additional research and writing, including ¶ with Golzar Kheiltash, Erin Osterhaus and Lara Berlin. The report was designed by Marla ¶ Keenan of Center for Civilians in Conflict. ¶ Liz Lucas of Center for Civilians in Conflict led media outreach with Greta Moseson, program coordinator at the Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, “The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions,” <http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The_Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf>]

Congressional oversight could theoretically exert pressure on the CIA to be abundantly cautious about complying with the law and ensuring the least possible civilian harm from drone strikes. The CIA, however, has effectively insulated itself from hard congressional ¶ scrutiny—especially damaging because, in the context of covert strikes, Congress is uniquely positioned to get answers and generate informed public debate. The CIA is subject to oversight by congressional committees: the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Extensive ¶ authorization and reporting requirements, including that the CIA keep the committees “fully ¶ and currently informed,” were formulated in response to successive scandals over CIA ¶ abuses, including the plotting of a coup against Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1970, ¶ domestic spying of antiwar activists that was revealed in 1974, and the Iran-Contra Affair.324¶ Congressional intelligence oversight has long been criticized as incomplete and ineffective, with the 9/11 Commission describing it as “dysfunctional” and listing it as one of the top ¶ problems in US national security.325 Though hampered in many ways, the oversight committees have sufficient authority to impact the CIA’s activities. Congress controls the CIA’s budget and can thus influence programs, seek changes, or get answers to inquiries.326 One study found that every staffer surveyed recalled at least one instance when an intelligence committee member “threatened ¶ to statutorily withhold funding as a lever for sharing of information ¶ that would not otherwise have been forthcoming.”327 Congressional ¶ staffers can also visit CIA stations and other sites to get facts on the ¶ ground, though whether this is possible with regard to the drone ¶ program is unknown.

### AT: Say No

#### Obama will follow through- aligns himself with Congress

Bellinger ’13 (John B. Bellinger III, Adjunct Senior Fellow for International and National Security Law, “Seeking Daylight on U.S. Drone Policy”, <http://www.cfr.org/drones/seeking-daylight-us-drone-policy/p30348>, March 29, 2013)

The president also has additional constitutional authority anytime to use force to protect the Unites States, either in self-defense or because he believes that it's in our national security interest. So if President Obama concludes that it's necessary to carry out a drone strike against a terror suspect, but that individual does not fall into the categories covered by the AUMF, he would have additional constitutional authority. But this administration has taken great pains to emphasize that it has been relying on congressional grant of authority rather than the president's own constitutional authority to conduct most of its counterterrorism operations. It has wanted to do that to contrast itself with the Bush administration, which had, at least early in its tenure, relied heavily on the president's constitutional authority. It's not clear though, at this point, given how old and somewhat limited the AUMF is, if the Obama administration has now been forced to rely on constitutional powers for certain drone strikes. It appears to many observers that the administration may be stretching the limits of the AUMF by targeting people who were not responsible for 9/11 or who were not affiliated or associated co-belligerents with those who carried out 9/11. In theory, could the president always claim constitutional authority with regard to these strikes? Although, as you pointed out, the administration is obviously loath to do that. This administration is already finding that 95 percent of its counterterrorism policies, and the legal basis therefore, are the same as the Bush administration's. Absolutely. I think the issue is, in this administration, political. This administration is already finding that 95 percent of its counterterrorism policies, and the legal basis therefore, are the same as the Bush administration's. It came into office with both domestic and international supporters expecting that it would change all of those policies. So one area where it really has been loath to act like the Bush administration is to rely heavily on the president's constitutional authority. We simply don't know whether they are doing it, but politically I'm sure that administration officials would be very reluctant to have to acknowledge that they are acting outside of the grant given to them by Congress.

### Power of the Purse Solvency Warrant

#### Congress would invoke the power of the purse- solves

Elsea et al ’13 (Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney; Michael John Garcia, Legislative Attorney; Thomas J. Nicola, Legislative Attorney; CRS Report for Congress, “Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations”, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/206121.pdf>, February 19, 2013)

The Purpose Statute states that funds may be used only for purposes for which they have been appropriated; by implication it precludes using funds for purposes that Congress has prohibited. When Congress states that no funds may be used for a purpose, an agency would violate the Purpose Statute if it should use funds for that purpose; it also in some circumstances could contravene a provision of the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. Section 1341. Section 1341 prohibits entering into obligations or expending funds in advance of or in excess of an amount appropriated unless authorized by law. If Congress has barred using funds for a purpose, entering into an obligation or expending any amount for it would violate the act by exceeding the amount— zero—that Congress has appropriated for the prohibited purpose.

### 2AC- Drone Shift

#### The alternative is non-violent cooperation, not worse strikes- that solves best

**Boyle ‘13** [Michael J. Boyle, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia. He was previously a Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews. He is also an alumnus of the Political Science Department at La Salle, research interests are on terrorism and political violence, with particular reference to the strategic use of violence in insurgencies and civil wars, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf>]

Finally, a number of experts have argued that drone strikes are not only effective but even morally required, because they cause fewer civilian casualties than air ¶ strikes or ground operations in combat zones.67 Contrasting the relative precision ¶ of drone warfare to indiscriminate attacks such as the firebombing of Dresden ¶ during the Second World War, Henry A. Crumpton, former deputy chief of ¶ the CIA’s counterterrorism centre, concluded that drones are a morally superior, ¶ even humane, form of warfare.68 Others have made the counterfactual argument: ¶ that far more US and allied troops and Afghan civilians would have been killed ¶ over time through enemy attacks and normal NATO ground and air operations ¶ if the high-level militants killed by the drone strikes had not been removed from ¶ the battlefield.69 Referring either to real casualties or to casualties prevented by ¶ keeping hardened terrorists off the battlefield, many experts have argued that ¶ drones are more attractive, and morally defensible, than aerial bombardments or ¶ ground military operations.¶ On this point, the distinction between drone strikes inside and outside a theatre ¶ of active combat becomes relevant. One could plausibly argue that drone strikes ¶ are a more humane option for active theatres of war, where the alternatives—¶ such as air strikes or ground operations—may kill more civilians.70 In this respect, ¶ the Pentagon-run drone programme in Afghanistan might be morally justifiable ¶ if the alternatives—such as US air strikes or Afghan ground operations—were ¶ worse from the vantage point of non-combatant casualties. At least in the first ¶ instance, this is an empirical question. If it is true that drones kill fewer Afghan civilians than NATO air strikes, it would be hard to argue that air strikes should ¶ be employed in preference to drones in active theatres of war, although hard ¶ questions would remain about the procedures and standards for selecting targets ¶ for those strikes.71 Yet this comparison breaks down when applied to the CIA-run ¶ drone programme operating in countries where the United States is not at war. ¶ In these cases, the comparison to normal war-fighting is fallacious: the alternative ¶ to drones in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere is not American-led ground operations or air strikes. The US is not formally at war with any of these states and is not legally entitled to use ground forces or air strikes on their territory (though ¶ this has not stopped the US from launching periodic air strikes in the past). The realistic alternatives to drones in these cases range from diplomatic pressure to capacity-building to even covert operations, all of which were employed to some benefit prior to the Obama administration’s escalation of drone strikes in 2009. In ¶ countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, a cost–benefit analysis of drones ¶ has to be measured against these plausible alternatives, not against options that are ¶ neither realistic nor legally permitted outside a war zone. In these cases, drones are ¶ likely to be found wanting. It is hard to argue, for example, that drone strikes will ¶ consistently be more effective and kill fewer civilians than carefully constructed ¶ covert operations against HVTs. It is also hard to argue that drone strikes constitute a durable or long-term strategy in countries where there is a pressing need for capacity-building, especially in policing and intelligence work. The cost–benefit ¶ analysis for drones in these cases needs to be measured against these less violent ¶ alternatives, not against extreme examples from wartime like the firebombing of ¶ Dresden.

### 2AC- “Targeted Killing” T

#### Counter-interp- “targeted killing” is lethal force against those not in custody- broad definitions are comparatively better than scholars like Anderson- it’s most real world for legal practice

**Guardian ’13** [Jan, translator at the International Monetary Fund, Resident Representative Office in Belarus, “TARGETED KILLINGS: A SUMMARY,” <http://acontrarioicl.com/2013/02/27/targeted-killings-a-summary/>]

Currently there is no legal definition of targeted killings in either international or domestic law.[1] ‘Targeted killing’ is rather a descriptive notion frequently used by international actors in order to refer to a specific action undertaken in respect to certain individuals.¶ Various scholars propose different definitions. Machon, for example, refers to ‘targeted killing’ as an “intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit governmental approval,”[2] whereas Solis suggests that for there to be a targeted killing (i) there must be an armed conflict, either international or non-international in character; (ii) the victim must be specifically targeted; (iii) he must be beyond a reasonable possibility of arrest; (iv) the killing must be authorized by senior military commanders or the head of government; (v) and the target must be either a combatant or someone directly participating in the hostilities.[3] But whereas some scholars seek to use a human rights-based definition, [4] others propose those which do not entail the applicability of international humanitarian law. [5]¶ However, such definitions are incorrect for several reasons. First of all, the definition of a ‘targeted killing’ has to be broad enough as to cover a wide range of practices and flexible enough as to encompass situations within and outside the scope of an armed conflict, thus, being subject to the application of both international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as opposed to the definition provided by some scholars and even states themselves.[6] Secondly, one should bear in mind that defining an act as an instance of ‘targeted killing’ should not automatically render the illegality of such an act at stake.[7] Moreover, the definition also has to cover situations where such an act is carried out by other subjects of international law, rather than only by states.¶ Therefore, maintaining an element-based approach and synthesizing common characteristics of multiple definitions, it is more advisable to use the one employed by Alston and Melzer, which refers to targeted killings as a use of lethal force by a subject of international law (encompassing non-state actors) that is directed against an individually selected person who is not in custody and that is intentional (rather than negligent or reckless), premeditated (rather than merely voluntary), and deliberate (meaning that ‘the death of the targeted person [is] the actual aim of the operation, as opposed to deprivations of life which, although intentional and premeditated, remain the incidental result of an operation pursuing other aims).[8]

#### They limit the heart of the topic- most strikes are signature-based, and they only allow bad drones affs that don’t solve

**VanValkenberg 3-2**-13 [Noah VanValkenberg, Contributing Writer for Outside Colby, a non-partisan political publication, “Making Drones More Effective: Refining a Necessary Practice in Warfare,” <http://outsidecolby.com/2013/03/making-drones-more-effective-refining-a-necessary-practice-in-warfare/>]

Drones are a crucial piece of the United States’ global war on terror. They have eliminated dangerous individuals such as Anwar al-Awlaki and other senior members of Al Qaeda. However, there is a significant difference between targeted strikes and “signature strikes”—and the use of the latter is only serving to endanger US security.¶ In a typical targeted strike, high-level terrorists are profiled and their names are passed up the chain of command. The National Security Adviser, in conjunction with the Director of Central Intelligence (CIA), will recommend individuals on this “kill list” to President Obama. Ultimately, the President makes the call of who to strike. This is the way drone strikes should work: a missile is only fired after careful analysis and evaluation by experts, and a decision by the President.¶ Signature strikes work entirely differently. Armed drones often loiter over a specific area with no specific mission. If they see a group of individuals acting suspiciously, a relatively low-level intelligence officer can make the call to shoot. The definition of “acting suspiciously” is particularly problematic, as a man carrying a rifle and riding in a pickup truck in the desert may meet that standard. Signature strikes have killed prominent pro-US Yemeni leaders, as documented in the New York Times, they have stoked significant anti-American sentiment, and they have killed 176 children in Northern Pakistan alone.¶ Currently, signature strikes make up the majority of drone attacks, and the targets’ identities are rarely conclusively known. According to an article published in the Journal of International Criminal Justice by Jens Ohlin, only eight percent of suspected militants killed in signature strikes between 2008 and 2010 were mid- to high-level targets. The rest posed no threat to US national security and the strikes incurred enormous collateral damage.¶ However, that collateral damage is enormous. According to the widely cited study Living Under Drones, published by Stanford and NYU, one signature strike alone killed forty members of a peaceful meeting of tribal elders in Northwest Pakistan. The same study argues that many individuals now refrain from going to funerals, because they are so frequently targeted by signature strikes.

Be reasonable – No consensus on targeted killing – includes assassination, decapitation, and drones.

Carvin, ’12 [Stephanie Carvin holds a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, “The Trouble With Targeted Killing”,August, 22 2012

<http://www.academia.edu/1502330/The_Trouble_With_Targeted_Killing> ]

As many studies on targeted killing note, there is no consensus as to what the term actually means or how it should be defined. For example, some scholars use the term “assassination” or “decapitation” to refer to policies that others might call “targeted killing.” This is a major factor in problems with comparing and contrasting empirical research, as will be discussed below. However, for the purpose of this article, targeted killing will be understood broadly as the planned direct killing of an individual because of their per-ceived membership (and often perceived leadership) of a terrorist movement. However, it will frequently make references to other understandings of “tar-geted killing” in literature that are narrower or wider to make various points or to describe certain arguments such as drone strikes.

### TK K

#### Their focus on discourses trades off with policy focus

Tuathail ‘96 (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

#### Scriptocentrism stops active politics

Conquergood ’2 [The Drama Review 46, 2 (T174), Summer 2002. Copyright 2002 New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Performance Studies Interventions and Radical Research pp 147. Dwight Conquergood was a professor of anthropology and performance studies at Northwestern University]

In even stronger terms, Raymond **Williams challenged** **the class-based arrogance of scriptocentrism, pointing to the “error” and “delusion” of** “highly educated” **people** who are “**so driven in on their reading” that “they fail to notice that there are other forms** of skilled, intelligent, creative activity” **such as** “theatre” and **“active politics**.” This error “resembles that of the narrow reformer who supposes that farm labourers and village craftsmen were once uneducated, merely because they could not read.” He argued that **“the contempt” for performance and practical activity**, “which is always latent in the highly literate, **is a mark of the observer’s limits**, not those of the activities themselves” ([1958] 1983:309).Williams critiqued scholars for limiting their sources to written materials; I agree with Burke that **scholarship is so skewed toward texts that even when researchers do attend to extralinguistic human action** and embodied events **they construe them as texts** to be read. According to de Certeau, **this scriptocentrism is a hallmark of Western imperialism**. Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign: “‘**Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]”**

### 2AC- Oklahoma

#### The affirmative is the opposite of faith in the sovereign and is a call for action

Plan text is not an end point- goal is not just eliminate drone but the warfare that the government engages in- if drones are a singular example- 1AC not an end point but a point of discussion

#### Our Role of the ballot is for the critic to vote for the side that advocates the best strategy to navigate intellectual and political authority as it relates to the lives of those effected.

Grossburg ’92 (Lawrence (University of Illinois) We Gotta Get Outta This Place, p. 362-364

In their desire to renounce vanguardism, hierarchy and authoritarianism, too many intellectuals have also renounced the value of intellectual and political authority. This renunciation of authority is predicated on a theoretical crisis of representation in which the authority of any knowledge is suspect, since all knowledge is historically determined and implicated in hierarchical relations of power. The political reflection of this suspicion is that structures and hierarchy are equated with domination. Intellectuals cannot claim to speak the “truth” of the world, and they cannot speak for or in the name of other people. There are only two strategies available to the critic. First, the ability to describe the reality of people’s experience or position in the world can be given over entirely to the people who are the subjects of the analysis. They are “allowed” to speak for themselves within the intellectual’s discourse. The critic merely inscribes the other’s own sense of their place within and relationship to specific experiences and practices.” Second, the critic analyzes his or her own position self-reflexivly, and its consequences for his or her study (i.e., my history and position have determined the inevitable failure of my authority) but without privileging that position. In either case, there is little room for the critic’s own authority. While such a moment of intellectual suspicion is necessary, it goes too far when it assumes that all knowledge claims are unjustified and unjustifiable, leaving the critic to celebrate difference and a radical and pluralist relativism. The fact of contextual determination does not by itself mean that all knowledge claims are false, nor does it mean that all such claims are equally invalid or useless responses to a particular context. It need not entail relativism. The fact that specific discourses are articulated into relations of power does not mean that these relations are necessary or guaranteed, nor that all knowledges are equally bad—and to be opposed—for even if they are implicated with particular structures of power, there is no reason to assume that all structures of power are equally bad. Such an assumption would entail the futility of political struggle and the end of history. This is the conundrum of the intellectual Left, for you can’t have knowledge without standards and authority. Similarly, although all structures of commonality, norrnality and the sacred may be suspect, social existence itself is impossible without at least the imagination of such possibilities. This “intellectual’s crisis” of representation becomes particularly dangerous when it is projected on everyday life and political struggle, when it is mistakenly identified with a very different crisis of authority. In the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate, post-Three Mile Island, post-Challenger, post-Jimmy Bakker world, many if not all of the traditional sources of moral, political and even intellectual authority (including those empowered by the postwar consensus) have col-lapsed or at least lost a good deal of their aura. There is a deep seated public anxiety that America’s power (moral, political, economic, etc.) is on the wane and that none of the traditional authorities is capable of protecting Americans from the many forces—natural and social—that threaten them. Here we must assent to part of the new conservative argument: Structures of ironic cynicism have become increasingly powerful and do represent a real cultural and political problem. Both ‘crises” involve a struggle to redefine cultural authority. For the former it is a struggle to reestablish the political possibility of theory. For the latter it involves the need to construct politically effective authorities, and to relocate the right of intellectuals to claim such authority without reproducing authoritarian relations. The intellectuals’ crisis is a reflexive and rather self-indulgent struggle against a pessimism which they have largely created for themselves. The conflation of the two glosses over the increasing presence (even as popular figures) of new conservative intellectuals, and the threatening implications of the power of a popular new conservatism. The new conservative alliance has quite intentionally addressed the crisis of authority, often blaming it on the Left’s intellectual crisis of representation (e.g., the attacks on ‘political correctness”), as the occasion for their own efforts to set new authorities in place new positions, new criteria and new statements. Left intellectuals have constructed their own irrelevance, not through their “elitist” language, but through their refusal to find appropriate forms and sites of authority. Authority is not necessarily authoritarian; it need not claim the privilege of an autonomous, sovereign and unified speaking subject. In the face of real historical relations of domination and subordination, political intervention seems to demand, as part of the political responsibility of those empowered to speak, that they speak to—and sometimes for—others. And sometimes that speech must address questions about the relative importance of different struggles and the relative value, even the enabling possibilities of, different structures.

#### Their impact is wrong – debate over even the most technical issues improves decision-making and advocacy

Ben- Naftali ‘3 (Orna Ben-Naftali, Head of the International Law Division and of the Law and Culture Division, The Law School, The College of Management Academic Studies, Spring 2003, ARTICLE: 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law': A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 Cornell Int'l L.J. 233)

Our analysis concludes that while a specific act of preemptive killing may be legal if it meets the above-specified requirements, the policy of state targeted preemptive killings is not. Furthermore, some specific acts of targeted killings may generate state responsibility, while others may constitute a war crime entailing criminal accountability. These conclusions, emanating from the reading of the three legal texts applicable to the context, and informed by a sensibility that coheres them, do not rest on a negation of the importance of the national interest in security. On the contrary, these conclusions incorporate and express the way it should be balanced with a minimum standard of humanity and against the relevant context. This delicate, ever precarious balance is at the heart of the democratic discourse. A democratic state is not a meek state. True, it is fighting with "one hand tied behind its back,"n342 as soberly observed by Chief Justice Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court, but democratic sensibilities internalize this limitation on State power, not as a source of weakness but as a sign of strength. Democracies require a public discourse forever alert to the importance of human rights, suspicious of the way power is used, and committed to the rule of law. The legal culture, in turn, while not a substitute for this public discourse, is never absent from it and indeed serves as a catalyst for its development. We therefore reject the notion that the policy of targeted killings, designed by Israel as a way to combat terrorist attacks, is beyond the purview of the rule of law.n343 We also deny the purist position suggesting that the legalistic nitty-gritty preoccupation with details entailed in the above discussion is likely to obscure and legitimize a harrowing policy; n344 one that, on principle, should be condemned. n345 This position in fact maintains that the legality or illegality of targeted state killings is not a legitimate issue of discussion; that while an emergency situation may exceptionally necessitate the deed, it should never be elevated to the sphere of the Word. n346 We appreciate the sensibility of this position, but, alas, do not find it sensible. Indeed, nor would the people who consider themselves victims of the policy of targeted killings, and appeal to the courts to intervene. n347 Purity belongs to the Platonic world of ideas; it is a necessary ideal to strive for, even if forever unachievable in this all too fallible City of Man. n348 In the best of all possible worlds law would be superfluous; in this world, it is a necessary, albeit insufficient means to achieve some possible betterment. This article hopes to contribute to this modest goal.

#### The Compassion disad- Affirming this ethic of compassion is an ethical necessity – only by privileging compassion can we stop otherization which causes violence

Porter ‘6 (Elisabeth, head of the School of International Studies at the University of South Australia, “Can Politics Practice Compassion?” hypatia 21:4, project muse)

I am defending the position that it is possible to be politically compassionate and just and that such a claim should be disentangled from notions of gender.12 I dispute the essentialist claim that women are naturally compassionate. However, because of women's traditional association with caring and their role as primary parent, many women are experienced in caring and tend to respond readily with compassion. As others also argue (Philips 1993, 70; Sevenhuijsen 1998, 13), I am emphasizing the interplay between the particularity of compassion and the universality of justice. Undoubtedly, the dichotomy of public justice associated with masculinity and private care associated with femininity narrowed moral parameters, harmfully cementing restrictive gendered stereotypes. Rather, the relationship between compassion and justice is rich. Compassion "helps us recognize our justice obligations to those distant from us" (Clement 1996, 85). Examples of justice obligations include welfare programs; foreign aid; famine and disaster relief; humane immigration policies; and relieving the suffering of families who are affected by terrorism in Bali, Iraq, Israel, London, Morocco, Northern Ireland, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the United States, and elsewhere. A choice between justice and compassion is false; considerations of justice "arise in and about the practice of care" (Bubeck 1995a, 189). Thus, a defense of the need for compassion is as much a defense for the rights of justice. Anticipating this defense was Elizabeth Bartlett's (1992) interpretation of Albert Camus' concept of rebellion in the novel The Plague. She made three points that resonate with my argument on the relationship between justice and care. First, justice originates from care. In Camus' ethic of rebellion, the passionate demand for justice and rights comes from compassionately witnessing and being outraged by such aggressive acts as battering, abuse, or police brutality, such incomprehensible injustices as innocent children suffering from malnutrition, and various forms of others' oppression. As Bartlett remarked, "It is these moments of compassionate recognition of human dignity, not a dispassionate calculation of rights, which give rise to the demand for justice" (1992, 84). Second, both justice and care imply community. In The Plague, rebellion is a rejection of all forms of oppression. Acts of compassion are choices to "suffer with" others in order to build solidarity.13 Third, care defines justice. For Camus, "only those actions which retain the impulse and commitment to care serve justice" through compassionate responses (Bartlett 1992, 86). This strong notion of compassionate justice in politics is necessary if we are to respond meaningfully to peoples' pain. The defense of compassionate justice is prominent in feminist literature because of women's historical experience of injustice and because of women's traditional association of caring. It is also prominent in postcolonial and development discourse where there are attempts to redress political injustice with the practical, compassionate development of human well-being. Responsibility for Connections The third potential barrier to realizing political compassion lies in the controversy as to who and what we are responsible for. I have argued elsewhere that responsibilities are based on the principles of connection (1991, 159). We carry out responsibilities through moral engagement with others. The question, "how can I (we) best meet my (our) caring responsibilities?" (Tronto 1993, 137) is central to, but not exclusive to feminist ethics. Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner, in expanding the relational dimension of ethics, argue that "somehow, we owe something to others and that our ability to handle what we owe to others decides in some sense who we are" (2001, 2). Yet this is not easy in practice. In our socially embodied moral world, our identities, relationships, and values differentially define our responsibilities. Practices of responsibility are situated culturally and many need changing. For example, in a materialist, technocratic age dominated by self-interest, compassionate impulses toward those who are suffering are dismissed readily as time-consuming, or consciences are salved by a quick donation to charity while complaining of "compassion fatigue." Yet after the anguish of 9/11, people in many nations reassessed their priorities and lifestyles, reaching out to loved ones and strangers in affirming ways.14 Some feminists see the particularity of responsibility as an obstacle to realizing political compassion. For example, Susan Mendus argues that "identity and morality are constituted by actual relationships of care between particular people," thus the concept of care does not translate readily to the wider political problems of hunger, poverty, refugee status, and war that require solutions for people we do not know (2000, 106). As I am arguing, it is not care alone or a particular relationship of care that enables compassionate responsibility, but a merging of a compassionate drive with a search for justice, equality, and rights. **Caring for someone necessarily encompasses a concern for his or her equality and rights.**

I am supporting a strong notion of compassionate justice that accepts responsibilities toward "particular others" who can include "actual starving children in Africa with whom one feels empathy" (Held 1987, 118). If we take seriously the idea of global interdependence, then regardless of our specific nationalities and races, we have "duties" to people who are distant from us and belong to other communities (Midgley 1999, 161). Amartya Sen also believes we have a "multiplicity of loyalties" (1996, 113) to humanity, our nation, city, community, family, and friends. Simone Weil's notion of "justice as compassion" also is one in which mutual respect for all humans grounds our obligations to prevent suffering and harm. She believes that we have an unconditional obligation not to let a single human suffer "when one has the chance of coming to his assistance" (quoted in R. Bell 1998, 114).15 This qualifier is important. **We cannot assume responsibility for all suffering, to do so is naïve. We can assume, however, some responsibility to try to alleviate suffering whenever we can.** Yet, as intimated earlier, in order to move beyond empathy, we must also address claims for justice and equality. Again, I suggest that without the compassionate drive that is prompted by visualizing the pain of injustice, we will not feel peoples' anguish, or bother to consider what they need. As individuals, we have responsibilities beyond our personal connections to assist whenever it is within our capacities and resources to do so. I do not want to give the impression that our entire lives should be devoted to attending to others' needs. To do so would return women to exclusive nurturance at the expense of self-development and public citizenship. It is, rather, a matter of acting with compassion when it is possible to do so, and the possibility of course is debatable and requires priorities, which differ with us all. Politically, this means that politicians, nations, and international organizations have a similar responsibility to alleviate the suffering that results when peoples' basic needs are not met. There is a heavy responsibility on wealthy nations where the extent of poverty and misery is not as conspicuous as elsewhere to assist less wealthy nations.16 State responsibility is acute when suffering is caused by harsh economic policies, careless sales of arms and military weapons, severe immigration rules, and obscene responses to terrorism by further acts of violence. With the majority of these massive global issues, most of us can only demonstrate the first stage of co-suffering, and perhaps move to the second and debate the merit of options that might meet peoples' needs, and alleviate suffering. This **vocal civic debate can provoke** the third process **of political responses that actually lead to political compassion. Given nations' moral failures of compassion and such conspicuous evidence of oppression, exploitation, brutality, and indifference, we need to** be observant, and understand the implications of a failure to practice compassion. To summarize this section, the conceptual barriers that prevent the practice of political compassion are significant but surmountable. Compassion is not too personal for politics. Rather**, it can be the emotion that helps prompt a critical scrutiny of institutional structures; it is the driving force toward the practice of compassionate justice**; and, as an emotion and response, it broadens political responsibilities. Political Compassion I now argue that political compassion is linked to the political goals of a good society and is achievable politically.17 This argument contrasts with that of Hannah Arendt, who wrote that compassion abolishes the distance between citizens and thus is "politically speaking, irrelevant and without consequence" (1973, 86). Arendt's belief is that whereas the public arena is a site for deliberation, dissent, and argument, compassion requires a direct response that talking distorts. Certainly, too much abstract discussion on poverty, asylum seekers, detention camps, or the effects of war delays actual decisions for change. However, later, I argue that dialogue is a crucial way for all concerned groups to ascertain the best way to respond to peoples' feelings of vulnerability. Particularly in the current global climate of heightened vulnerability to terrorist attacks, the need for protection is powerful. Within liberal democracies, we are more accustomed to emphases on autonomy and self-sufficiency than the need for protection. While care ethics recognizes that we all are vulnerable in the sense that fortune and fate are "morally arbitrary" (Porter 1995, 181) and this is why it is important that we care about each other, most care ethics literature refers to the vulnerable either as children or as those requiring [End Page 109] welfare, disability rights, or health care. In the present international context, we often lose sight of personal powerlessness and politically equate vulnerability with minimizing the possibility of terrorist threats. Considerations of national security thus dominate over human security. Certainly, terrorist threats must be dealt with appropriately, **but the means of national protection should not be at the expense of the emotional safety of** such **vulnerable groups** as asylum seekers. States need to maximize security, but "there are broader understandings of human security that encompass social well-being and the security of political, civil, social, cultural, and economic rights" (Porter 2003b, 9). The defense of human security can adopt an attitude toward the vulnerable of protective "holding," which minimizes harmful risk and reconciles differences (Ruddick 1990, 78–79). How democratic nations deal with the vilification or reconciliation of cultural and religious differences is central to the practice of political compassion. For example, asylum seekers rightfully seek refuge, safety, and security, under United Nations conventions. These rights include the right to seek asylum and the right to request assistance to secure safety in their own countries. Those seeking such rights increasingly are facing governments with tightened borders. In multicultural states, tolerance, trust, and openness are essential for positive civic relationships. **Since 9/11, there has been a movement away from open tolerance to closed dichotomies based on an "othering,"** a stereotyping of groups considered different from "us." **These dichotomies are not harmless opposites; they "mask the power of one side of the binary to control the other**" (D. Bell 2002, 433**), like us/them, citizen/foreigner, friends/enemies, and good/evil. Absolutist dichotomies are blind to nuances, middle-ground positions, particular contexts, and connections, all the considerations of judgment needed for wise, compassionate decisions**. Importantly, absolutist dichotomies are oblivious to the pain of those who are excluded, those most in need of protection. They make people feel "at risk" simply for looking different or having a different faith. Those with absolutist views see "illegal immigrants" and "queue jumpers" rather than desperate, fearful people seeking legitimate asylum. A classic example of this binary control is President George W. Bush's ultimatum, "If you're not with us, you're against us**." A simplistic with us/against us**, free world/axis of **evil analysis cements an inclusion/exclusion that fails to comprehend the pain of those who are excluded**.

**Attrocities are inevitable and require a response—language has the power to facilitate or confront attrocity. Deconstructing language breeds cynicism and nihilism that greases the wheels to further attrocities**

**Ketels, 96** (Violet, professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November, lexis)

 [\*46]  THE political bestiality of our age is abetted by our willingness to tolerate the deconstructing of humanist values. The process begins with the cynical manipulation of language. It often ends in stupefying murderousness before which the world stands silent, frozen in impotent "attentism"--a wait-and-see stance as unsuited to the human plight as a pacifier is to stopping up the hunger of a starving child. We have let lapse our pledge to the 6 million Jewish victims of the Holocaust that their deaths might somehow be transfiguring for humankind. We allow "slaughterhouse men" tactical status at U.N. tables and "cast down our eyes when the depraved roar past." [1](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fdf65367957929014062cbd6ec20591&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=379d63c16278cd52310a5c612eb51a93&focBudTerms=havel%20to%20the%20castle&focBudSel=all#n1) Peacemakers, delegated by us and circumscribed by our fears, temporize with thugs who have revived lebensraum claims more boldly than Hitler did. In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence. We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that only the unbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it--only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peace for the individual, of genuine peace for mankind at large. [2](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fdf65367957929014062cbd6ec20591&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=379d63c16278cd52310a5c612eb51a93&focBudTerms=havel%20to%20the%20castle&focBudSel=all#n2) In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however, intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience. "Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills," [3](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fdf65367957929014062cbd6ec20591&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=379d63c16278cd52310a5c612eb51a93&focBudTerms=havel%20to%20the%20castle&focBudSel=all#n3) we seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content," [4](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fdf65367957929014062cbd6ec20591&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=379d63c16278cd52310a5c612eb51a93&focBudTerms=havel%20to%20the%20castle&focBudSel=all#n4) monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge. [5](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fdf65367957929014062cbd6ec20591&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=379d63c16278cd52310a5c612eb51a93&focBudTerms=havel%20to%20the%20castle&focBudSel=all#n5) Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the  [\*47]  humanist soul," [6](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fdf65367957929014062cbd6ec20591&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=379d63c16278cd52310a5c612eb51a93&focBudTerms=havel%20to%20the%20castle&focBudSel=all#n6) to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts." [7](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fdf65367957929014062cbd6ec20591&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=379d63c16278cd52310a5c612eb51a93&focBudTerms=havel%20to%20the%20castle&focBudSel=all#n7) Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue. Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains,

dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now. The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face. [8](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fdf65367957929014062cbd6ec20591&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=379d63c16278cd52310a5c612eb51a93&focBudTerms=havel%20to%20the%20castle&focBudSel=all#n8) Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying. Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety? Not only before but also since 1945, the criminality of governments, paraded as politics and fattening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread calamity across the planet. "The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [has] Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvoke as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in 1389! [9](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fdf65367957929014062cbd6ec20591&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=379d63c16278cd52310a5c612eb51a93&focBudTerms=havel%20to%20the%20castle&focBudSel=all#n9) Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian people waged only one battle--by widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs to the martyrs of Kosovo. . . . Kosovo is the Serbianized  [\*48]  history of the Flood--the Serbian New Testament." [10](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fdf65367957929014062cbd6ec20591&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=379d63c16278cd52310a5c612eb51a93&focBudTerms=havel%20to%20the%20castle&focBudSel=all#n10) A cover of Suddeutsche Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited. [11](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fdf65367957929014062cbd6ec20591&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=379d63c16278cd52310a5c612eb51a93&focBudTerms=havel%20to%20the%20castle&focBudSel=all#n11) We stand benumbed before multiplying horrors. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, regimes that generate them "are the avant garde of a global crisis in civilization." The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and apparat," pathological suspicions about human motives and meanings, the loosening of individual responsibility, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our conscience, of our common sense and natural speech and thereby, of our actual humanity." [12](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fdf65367957929014062cbd6ec20591&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=379d63c16278cd52310a5c612eb51a93&focBudTerms=havel%20to%20the%20castle&focBudSel=all#n12) Nothing less than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.

#### Rejection of the state accomplishes NOTHING – they need a pragmatic reimagination of politics to prevent failure of their movement – this card SMOKES the K.

Pasha ’96 [July-Sept. 1996, Mustapha Kamal, Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen, “Security as Hegemony”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 283-302, JSTOR]

An attack on the postcolonial state as the author of violence and its drive to produce a modern citizenry may seem cathartic, without producing the semblance of an alternative vision of a new political community or fresh forms of life among existing political communities. Central to this critique is an assault on the state and other modern institutions said to disrupt some putatively natural flow of history. Tradition, on this logic, is uprooted to make room for grafted social forms; modernity gives birth to an intolerant and insolent Leviathan, a repository of violence and instrumental rationality's finest speci- men. Civil society - a realm of humaneness, vitality, creativity, and harmony - is superseded, then torn asunder through the tyranny of state-building. The attack on the institution of the state appears to substitute teleology for ontology. In the Third World context, especially, the rise of the modern state has been coterminous with the negation of past histories, cultures, identities, and above all with violence. The stubborn quest to construct the state as the fount of modernity has subverted extant communities and alternative forms of social organization. The more durable consequence of this project is in the realm of the political imaginary: the constrictions it has afforded; the denials of alternative futures. The postcolonial state, however, has also grown to become more heterodox - to become more than simply modernity's reckless agent against hapless nativism. The state is also seen as an expression of **greater capacities against want, hunger, and injustice**; as an escape from the arbitrariness of communities established on narrower rules of inclusion/exclusion; as identity removed somewhat from capri- cious attachments. No doubt, the modern state has undermined tra- ditional values of tolerance and pluralism, subjecting indigenous so- ciety to Western-centered rationality. But tradition can also conceal particularism and oppression of another kind. Even the most elastic interpretation of universality cannot find virtue in attachments re- furbished by hatred, exclusivity, or religious bigotry. **A negation of the state is no guarantee that a bridge to universality can be built.** Perhaps the task is to rethink modernity, not to seek refuge in a blind celebration of tradition. Outside, the state continues to inflict a self-producing "security dilemma"; inside, it has stunted the emergence of more humane forms of political expres- sion. But there are always sites of resistance that can be recovered and sustained. **A rejection of the state** as a superfluous leftover of modernity that continues to straitjacket the South Asian imagination **must be linked to the project of creating an ethical and humane order** based on a restructuring of the state system that privileges the mighty and the rich over the weak and the poor.74 Recognizing the constrictions of the modern Third World state, **a reconstruction** of state-society re- lations **inside the state appears to be a more fruitful avenue than wishing the state away, only to be swallowed by Western-centered globalization and its powerful institutions.**A **recognition of the patent failure of other institutions either to deliver the social good or to procure more just distributional rewards in the global political economy may provide a sobering reassessment of the role of the state.** An appreciation of the scale of human tragedy accompanying the collapse of the state in many local contexts may also provide **im- portant points of entry into rethinking the one-sided onslaught on the state**. Nowhere are these costs borne more heavily than in the postcolonial, so-called Third World, where time-space compression has rendered societal processes more savage and less capable of ad- justing to rhythms dictated by globalization

#### Their impact is wrong – debate over even the most technical issues improves decision-making and advocacy

Ben- Naftali ‘3 (Orna Ben-Naftali, Head of the International Law Division and of the Law and Culture Division, The Law School, The College of Management Academic Studies, Spring 2003, ARTICLE: 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law': A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 Cornell Int'l L.J. 233)

Our analysis concludes that while a specific act of preemptive killing may be legal if it meets the above-specified requirements, the policy of state targeted preemptive killings is not. Furthermore, some specific acts of targeted killings may generate state responsibility, while others may constitute a war crime entailing criminal accountability. These conclusions, emanating from the reading of the three legal texts applicable to the context, and informed by a sensibility that coheres them, do not rest on a negation of the importance of the national interest in security. On the contrary, these conclusions incorporate and express the way it should be balanced with a minimum standard of humanity and against the relevant context. This delicate, ever precarious balance is at the heart of the democratic discourse. A democratic state is not a meek state. True, it is fighting with "one hand tied behind its back,"n342 as soberly observed by Chief Justice Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court, but democratic sensibilities internalize this limitation on State power, not as a source of weakness but as a sign of strength. Democracies require a public discourse forever alert to the importance of human rights, suspicious of the way power is used, and committed to the rule of law. The legal culture, in turn, while not a substitute for this public discourse, is never absent from it and indeed serves as a catalyst for its development. We therefore reject the notion that the policy of targeted killings, designed by Israel as a way to combat terrorist attacks, is beyond the purview of the rule of law.n343 We also deny the purist position suggesting that the legalistic nitty-gritty preoccupation with details entailed in the above discussion is likely to obscure and legitimize a harrowing policy; n344 one that, on principle, should be condemned. n345 This position in fact maintains that the legality or illegality of targeted state killings is not a legitimate issue of discussion; that while an emergency situation may exceptionally necessitate the deed, it should never be elevated to the sphere of the Word. n346 We appreciate the sensibility of this position, but, alas, do not find it sensible. Indeed, nor would the people who consider themselves victims of the policy of targeted killings, and appeal to the courts to intervene. n347 Purity belongs to the Platonic world of ideas; it is a necessary ideal to strive for, even if forever unachievable in this all too fallible City of Man. n348 In the best of all possible worlds law would be superfluous; in this world, it is a necessary, albeit insufficient means to achieve some possible betterment. This article hopes to contribute to this modest goal.

#### The right fills in easily

Lobel ‘7 (Orly Lobel, University of San Diego Assistant Professor of Law, 2007, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics,” 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf)

Both the practical failures and the fallacy of rigid boundaries generated by extralegal activism rhetoric permit us to broaden our inquiry to the underlying assumptions of current proposals regarding transformative politics — that is, attempts to produce meaningful changes in the political and socioeconomic landscapes. The suggested alternatives produce a new image of social and political action. This vision rejects a shared theory of social reform, rejects formal programmatic agendas, and embraces a multiplicity of forms and practices. Thus, it is described in such terms as a plan of no plan,211 “a project of projects,”212 “anti-theory theory,”213 politics rather than goals,214 presence rather than power,215 “practice over theory,”216 and chaos and openness over order and formality. As a result, the contemporary message rarely includes a comprehensive vision of common social claims, but rather engages in the description of fragmented efforts. As Professor Joel Handler argues, the commonality of struggle and social vision that existed during the civil rights movement has disappeared.217 There is no unifying discourse or set of values, but rather an aversion to any metanarrative and a resignation from theory. Professor Handler warns that this move away from grand narratives is self-defeating precisely because only certain parts of the political spectrum have accepted this new stance: “[T]he opposition is not playing that game . . . . [E]veryone else is operating as if there were Grand Narratives . . . .”218 Intertwined with the resignation from law and policy, the new bromide of “neither left nor right” has become axiomatic only for some.219 The contemporary critical legal consciousness informs the scholarship of those who are interested in progressive social activism, but less so that of those who are interested, for example, in a more competitive securities market. Indeed, an interesting recent development has been the rise of “conservative public interest lawyer[ing].”220 Although “public interest law” was originally associated exclusively with liberal projects, in the past three decades conservative advocacy groups have rapidly grown both in number and in their vigorous use of traditional legal strategies to promote their causes.221 This growth in conservative advocacy is particularly salient in juxtaposition to the decline of traditional progressive advocacy. Most recently, some thinkers have even suggested that there may be “something inherent in the left’s conception of social change — focused as it is on participation and empowerment — that produces a unique distrust of legal expertise.”222 Once again, this conclusion reveals flaws parallel to the original disenchantment with legal reform. Although the new extralegal frames present themselves as apt alternatives to legal reform models and as capable of producing significant changes to the social map, in practice they generate very limited improvement in existing social arrangements. Most strikingly, the cooptation effect here can be explained in terms of the most profound risk of the typology — that of legitimation. The common pattern of extralegal scholarship is to describe an inherent instability in dominant structures by pointing, for example, to grassroots strategies,223 and then to assume that specific instances of counterhegemonic activities translate into a more complete transformation. This celebration of multiple micro-resistances seems to rely on an aggregate approach — an idea that the multiplication of practices will evolve into something substantial. In fact, the myth of engagement obscures the actual lack of change being produced, while the broader pattern of equating extralegal activism with social reform produces a false belief in the potential of change. There are few instances of meaningful reordering of social and economic arrangements and macro-redistribution. Scholars write about decoding what is really happening, as though the scholarly narrative has the power to unpack more than the actual conventional experience will admit.224 Unrelated efforts become related and part of a whole through mere reframing. At the same time, the elephant in the room — the rising level of economic inequality — is left unaddressed and comes to be understood as natural and inevitable.225 This is precisely the problematic process that critical theorists decry as losers’ self-mystification, through which marginalized groups come to see systemic losses as the product of their own actions and thereby begin to focus on minor achievements as representing the boundaries of their willed reality. The explorations of micro-instances of activism are often fundamentally performative, obscuring the distance between the descriptive and the prescriptive. The manifestations of extralegal activism — the law and organizing model; the proliferation of informal, soft norms and norm-generating actors; and the celebrated, separate nongovernmental sphere of action — all produce a fantasy that change can be brought about through small-scale, decentralized transformation. The emphasis is local, but the locality is described as a microcosm of the whole and the audience is national and global. In the context of the humanities, Professor Carol Greenhouse poses a comparable challenge to ethnographic studies from the 1990s, which utilized the genres of narrative and community studies, the latter including works on American cities and neighborhoods in trouble.226 The aspiration of these genres was that each individual story could translate into a “time of the nation” body of knowledge and motivation.227 In contemporary legal thought, a corresponding gap opens between the local scale and the larger, translocal one. In reality, although there has been a recent proliferation of associations and grassroots groups, few new local-statenational federations have emerged in the United States since the 1960s and 1970s, and many of the existing voluntary federations that flourished in the mid-twentieth century are in decline.228 There is, therefore, an absence of links between the local and the national, an absent intermediate public sphere, which has been termed “the missing middle” by Professor Theda Skocpol.229 New social movements have for the most part failed in sustaining coalitions or producing significant institutional change through grassroots activism. Professor Handler concludes that this failure is due in part to the ideas of contingency, pluralism, and localism that are so embedded in current activism.230 Is the focus on small-scale dynamics simply an evasion of the need to engage in broader substantive debate? It is important for next-generation progressive legal scholars, while maintaining a critical legal consciousness, to recognize that not all extralegal associational life is transformative. We must differentiate, for example, between inward-looking groups, which tend to be self-regarding and depoliticized, and social movements that participate in political activities, engage the public debate, and aim to challenge and reform existing realities.231 We must differentiate between professional associations and more inclusive forms of institutions that act as trustees for larger segments of the community.232 As described above, extralegal activism tends to operate on a more divided and hence a smaller scale than earlier social movements, which had national reform agendas. Consequently, within critical discourse there is a need to recognize the limited capacity of small-scale action. We should question the narrative that imagines consciousness-raising as directly translating into action and action as directly translating into change. Certainly not every cultural description is political. Indeed, it is questionable whether forms of activism that are opposed to programmatic reconstruction of a social agenda should even be understood as social movements. In fact, when groups are situated in opposition to any form of institutionalized power, they may be simply mirroring what they are fighting against and merely producing moot activism that settles for what seems possible within the narrow space that is left in a rising convergence of ideologies. The original vision is consequently coopted, and contemporary discontent is legitimated through a process of self-mystification.

#### Only the perm prevents the alt from self-defeat

Prozorov ‘5 (Sergei, Department of International Relations at Petrozavodsk State University, “X/Xs: Toward a General Theory of the Exception”, Alternatives 30 (2005), 81-112)

More specifically, the same argument concerns the principle of sovereignty as the ontological condition of power relations. Within the context of critical theories of international relations, this entails abandoning the facile critique of sovereignty as either allegedly outdated in the conditions of "globalization" (which is itself a discourse that disavows sovereignty without actually dispensing with it)-'^ or inherently authoritarian, and hence to be supplanted by more "decentered" or "inclusive" forms of political organization (a sterile valorization of "better X without Xs"). The temptation to dispense with sovereignty in critical thought is easily understandable: after all, the ultimate lesson of Schmitt's political ontology is that at the heart of any order, including the Utopian configurations that preoccupy much critical research, is the constitutive decision that is irreducibly violent, an instance of pure force emanating from the void. In my reading, sovereignty as an Xs concept is a permanent reminder of the impossibility of immaculate conception in political life and thus an irritable stain on every tidy script of a "better society" Insofar as one does want to pursue a proper critique of sovereignty, it must logically be an enterprise whose discomforting contours are hinted at by Edkins and Pin-Fat: "it is only through a refusal to draw any lines at all (and indeed nothing less will do) that sovereign power (as a form of violence) can be contested and a properly political power relation reinstated."'"" Thus, if it is the constitutive violence of the logic of sovereignty that is the target of criticism, the proper avenues of critique appear self-defeatingly extreme, if not outright inconceivable: the total refusal to draw dividing lines and installing limits is ultimately a call to dispense with the very principle of order. However, as my discussion suggests, it is more fruitful not to criticize sovereignty, but to focus on its own critical functions. Particularly in the Schmittian "quasi-transcendental" understanding, the concept appears to be far from outdated or "conservative," but rather belongs squarely to the critical register, insofar as we understand critique in the analytic sense of elucidating the conditions of possibility of phenomena rather than in the normative sense of arguing over different versions of "good life." Thus, against the claim of Edkins and Pin-Fat that "resistance to sovereign power takes place when there is a demand for a return to properly political power relations,"101 I venture an argument that appears to be the distilled essence of Schmitt's thought: any return to properly political power relations must traverse the moment of reassertion of sovereign power as the transgressive foundation of politics. Recalling my criticism of the Agambenian gesture of collapsing the X/Xs distinction, let me suggest that the critique of the excessive nature of X (the sterility of depoliticized and technicized administration of people and things in various positive forms of order) must not throw the baby away with the bathwater by disavowing the excess of X that remains unsubsumed under the X principles and logically has nothing to do with the excessiveness of X. The quaintly paradoxical character of resistance proposed by Edkins and Pin-Fat may be illustrated with the examples from the "nonpolitical" domains we have addressed: it is as if the resistance to the monotony of doctrinal prescriptions of behavior in a religion must necessarily take the form of atheism or the dissatisfaction with the routines of married life must lead to the cessation of all romantic interest. In short, rather than "repoliticize" the existing order, the denial of its sovereign excess leaves one with little other than a sense of resignation and cynical pessimism.

#### Drone turn standing reserve impact

KD ’12 (Know Drones, “US DRONES ARE BLOCKING ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION”, <http://www.knowdrones.com/2012/09/us-drones-are-blocking-environmental-revolution.html>, September 2012)

In 1935, retired Marine General Smedley Butler said of his military career: “I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers.” Today, if we look where US drones are attacking – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia – we find areas rich in oil, minerals, agricultural products and/or important to shipment of these commodities. We also find that these are places where natural resources have been extracted by US and European corporations for decades, not to the benefit or under the control of the majority of people. US military power has been used repeatedly to protect and reinforce the global positions of multi-national corporations. For the world, and particularly in the case of oil, this has meant an unrestrained squandering of resources and gross poisoning of the environment and accelerating global warming. Corporations after all have no legal obligation to do anything but increase profits for their shareholders. We also can see that globally, as with the Arab Spring in the Middle East, people, especially young people, are demanding control over their homelands’ resources. US drone attacks are part of an attempt to ensure that corporations will continue to enjoy their advantages in this period of awakening and that their policies of extraction will continue as before. In spite of the drone onslaught, we can see hope. For example the political/environmental movement of the Bolivian people, which has been opposed by the United States, may lead to an environmental revolution. Bolivia is getting ready to pass what The Guardian newspaper describes as the world’s first law to grant Nature rights equal to those of humans. The Law of Mother Earth, The Guardian says, “redefines the country’s rich mineral deposits as ‘blessings’ and is expected to lead to radical new conservation and social measures to reduce pollution and control industry.” Ending drone warfare and US and western military occupations will not only save lives but will speed the time when gross, wide-spread environmental destruction can be stopped by people around the world.

#### Inclusion of agency into politics destroys vtl and risk global problems

Graham ’99 (Philip Graham School of Communication Queensland University of Technology, Heidegger’s Hippies Sep 15 1999 http://www.geocities.com/SunsetStrip/Palms/8314/index.html)

Societies should get worried when Wagner’s music becomes popular because it usually means that distorted interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy are not far away. Existentialists create problems about what is, especially identity (Heidegger 1947). Existentialism inevitably leads to an authoritarian worldview: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without a goal, unless the joy of the circle itself is a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself – do you want a name for this world? A solution to all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? – This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1967/1997). Armed with a volume of Nietzsche, some considerable oratory skills, several Wagner records, and an existentialist University Rector in the form of Martin Heidegger, Hitler managed some truly astounding feats of strategic identity engineering (cf. Bullock, 1991). Upon being appointed to the Freiberg University, Heidegger pronounced the end of thought, history, ideology, and civilisation: ‘No dogmas and ideas will any longer be the laws of your being. The Fuhrer himself, and he alone, is the present and future reality for Germany’ (in Bullock 1991: 345). Heidegger signed up to an ideology-free politics: Hitler’s ‘Third Way’ (Eatwell 1997). The idealised identity, the new symbol of mythological worship, Nietzsche’s European Superman, was to rule from that day hence. Hitler took control of the means of propaganda: the media; the means of mental production: the education system; the means of violence: the police, army, and prison system; and pandered to the means of material production: industry and agriculture; and proclaimed a New beginning and a New world order. He ordered Germany to look forward into the next thousand years and forget the past. Heidegger and existentialism remain influential to this day, and history remains bunk (e.g. Giddens , 1991, Chapt. 2).Giddens’s claims that ‘humans live in circumstances of … existential contradiction’, and that ‘subjective death’ and ‘biological death’ are somehow unrelated, is a an ultimately repressive abstraction: from that perspective, life is merely a series of subjective deaths, as if death were the ultimate motor of life itself (cf. Adorno 1964/1973). History is, in fact, the simple and straightforward answer to the “problem of the subject”. “The problem” is also a handy device for confusing, entertaining, and selling trash to the masses. By emphasising the problem of the ‘ontological self’ (Giddens 1991: 49), informationalism and ‘consumerism’ confines the navel-gazing, ‘narcissistic’ masses to a permanent present which they self-consciously sacrifice for a Utopian future (cf. Adorno 1973: 303; Hitchens 1999; Lasch 1984: 25-59). Meanwhile transnational businesses go about their work, raping the environment; swindling each other and whole nations; and inflicting populations with declining wages, declining working conditions, and declining social security. Slavery is once again on the increase (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1999; ILO, 1998). There is no “problem of the subject”, just as there is no “global society”; there is only the mass amnesia of utopian propaganda, the strains of which have historically accompanied revolutions in communication technologies. Each person’s identity is, quite simply, their subjective account of a unique and objective history of interactions within the objective social and material environments they inhabit, create, and inherit. The identity of each person is their most intimate historical information, and they are its material expression: each person is a record of their own history at any given time. Thus, each person is a recognisably material, identifiable entity: an identity. This is their condition. People are not theoretical entities; they are people. As such, they have an intrinsic identity with an intrinsic value.

No amount of theory or propaganda will make it go away. The widespread multilateral attempts to prop up consumer society and hypercapitalism as a valid and useful means of sustainable growth, indeed, as the path to an inevitable, international democratic Utopia, are already showing their disatrous cracks. The “problem” of subjective death threatens to give way, once again, to unprecedented mass slaughter. The numbed condition of a narcissistic society, rooted in a permanent “now”, a blissful state of Heideggerian Dasein, threatens to wake up to a world in which “subjective death” and ontology are the least of all worries.

# **1AR**

### Circumvention

#### Obama will comply --- the plan walks the fine-line --- failure to walk the constitution is worse

BARRON 2008 - Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center (David J. Barron, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -- A Constitutional History”, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis)

In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also illuminates the practices of the President in creating the constitutional law of war powers at the "lowest ebb." Given the apparent advantages to the Executive of possessing preclusive powers in this area, it is tempting to think that Commanders in Chief would always have claimed a unilateral and unregulable authority to determine the conduct of military operations. And yet, as we show, for most of our history, the presidential **practice was otherwise**. Several of our most esteemed Presidents - Washington, Lincoln, and both Roosevelts, among others - never invoked the sort of preclusive claims of authority that some modern Presidents appear to embrace without pause. In fact, no Chief Executive did so in any clear way until the onset of the Korean War, even when they confronted problematic restrictions, some of which could not be fully interpreted away and some of which even purported to regulate troop deployments and the actions of troops already deployed.

Even since claims of preclusive power emerged in full, the practice within the executive branch has waxed and waned. No consensus among modern Presidents has crystallized. Indeed, rather than denying the authority of Congress to act in this area, some **modern Presidents**, like their predecessors, have **acknowledged** the **constitutionality of legislative regulation**. They have therefore concentrated their efforts on making effective use of other presidential authorities and institutional [\*949] advantages to shape military matters to their preferred design. n11 In sum, there has been much less executive assertion of an inviolate power over the conduct of military campaigns than one might think. And, perhaps **most importantly,** until recently there has been almost **no** actual **defiance** of statutory limitations predicated on such a constitutional theory.

This repeated, though not unbroken, deferential executive branch stance is not, we think, best understood as evidence of the timidity of prior Commanders in Chief. Nor do we think it is the accidental result of political conditions that just happened to make it expedient for all of these Executives to refrain from lodging such a constitutional objection. This consistent pattern of executive behavior is more accurately viewed as reflecting deeply rooted norms and understandings of how the Constitution structures conflict between the branches over war. In particular, this well-developed executive branch practice appears to be premised on the assumption that the constitutional plan requires the nation's chief commander **to guard his supervisory powers** over the military chain of command **jealously**, to be willing to act in times of exigency if Congress is not available for consultation, and to use the very powerful weapon of the veto to forestall unacceptable limits proposed in the midst of military conflict - **but** that otherwise, the Constitution compels the Commander in Chief to comply with legislative restrictions.

In this way, the founding legal charter itself exhorts the President to justify controversial military judgments to a sympathetic but sometimes skeptical or demanding legislature and nation, not only for the sake of liberty, but also for effective and prudent conduct of military operations. Justice Jackson's famous instruction that "with all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations" n12 continues to have a strong pull on the constitutional imagination. n13 What emerges from our analysis is how much pull it seemed to [\*950] have on the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.

### Case

#### Their paradigm of a universal psyche arises from an oppressive paradigm. Oppressed cultures are mined for a glimpse of the so-called primitive psyche, unfettered by superegoic fantasy.

Brickman ‘3 [Celia (Center for Religion and Psychotherapy of Chicago, PhD in Religion and the Human Sciences at the University of Chicago); Aboriginal Populations in the Mind: Race and Primitivity in Psychoanalysis; Columbia University Press; New York; p. 118-119 //nick]

But a subjectivity (psychoanalytically conceived of as) emerging through separation and exclusion produces an excluded remainder - the primitive/maternal as the matrix of undifferentiated being—that becomes identified with actual gendered and raced others who are held to be both psychologically and socially inferior. Lacanian, Krisrevan, and object relations perspectives all posit subjectivity as founded through separations, exclusions, and repressions, which in turn presuppose an initial stage of infancy in which the infant cannot distinguish between self and other, between self and surround: they all posit a period of undifferentiated immersion in the natural and maternal relationship from which the subject must separate. To this we may juxtapose Freud’s contention that the historical/evolutionary emergence of individual subjectivity was effected by separation from submergence in the social ties of primary identification and enthrallment that held primitive communities together, constituting a “group mind” in which group members lacked individuality, which is to say they were undifferentiated from one another. In both cases, what is separated from or excluded becomes repressed but continues to threaten the subject via regression to an annihilating absorption in primitive/maternal undifferentiation. Theories that see the subject as formed through separation and exclusion require the prior hypothesis of this preexisting undifferentiation, which is identified with the maternal in a developmental register; and which, through the psychoanalytic identification of maternity with primitivity, is identified with the primitive in an evolutionary register. In this preexisting undifferentiation we can see, in Homi Bhabha’s words, “the impossible desire for a pure, undifferentiated origin” with which the “‘official knowledges’ of colonialism are imbricated.”93 Development is then conceived in terms of the distance effected by separation from and repudiation of a relationship of undifferentiation with mother/nature/primitivity, through the mediation of the father/civilizing law. Particularly in the Lacanian-derived accounts, the very possibility of achieving subjectivity, of participating in the representational structures that govern one’s existence, is predicated on a repudiation or splitting off of the maternal, primitive, abjected elements of the psyche. This repudiation is figured as the crucial operation necessary to the attainment of cultural legibility; it is figured as inevitable, universal, and ahistoric, As Butler writes, from this perspective it seems that there is no possibility of speaking, of taking a position in language outside of differentiating moves, not only through a differentiation from the maternal which is said to install a speaker in language for the first time, but [through] further differentiations among speakers positioned within kinship.94 The laws of language and subjectivity appear to be part of an unavoidable prison of gender and racial asymmetry: if one tries to escape the repudiation of the primitive/maternal one refuses the possibility of speaking, of being heard, of becoming a subject at all.

### k

#### People need to be able to decide whether to live or die themselves

**Goodin ‘95** (Robert, professor of social sciences and philosopher at the Research School of Social Sciences at Australian National University, “Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy”, p. 39)

The rather more grand way of phrasing the point here might be couched in terms of undermining moral agency. Failure to discharge isolated, individual responsibilities may well result in other people's being harmed. That is wrong, but it is, at least in principle, a remediable wrong. People can, at least in principle, always be compensated for harms to their interests (or so the libertarian would claim, anyway). Failure to discharge shared, collective responsibilities has more grievous consequences, undermining in certain crucial respects other people's moral agency itself. For that, compensation is in principle impossible. **There must be a moral agent to be compensated, and it is that very moral agency that is being undermined."**

#### Lack of an objective truth doesn’t justify inaction – their philosophy is based on equally unverifiable assumptions and results in nihilism and political paralysis – we should act based on empirical knowledge.

**Loewy – 91** Erich, associate professor of medicine at the University of Illinois and associate professor of humanities, “Suffering and the Beneficent Community: Beyond Libertarianism,” p. 17-21

All of our judgments and decisions ultimately must be grounded in nonverifiable assumptions. The fundamentalist may deny this; but the fundamentalist grounds her judgments and decisions either in a religious belief based on revealed truth or, at least, on the assumption that “somewhere out there” truth exists and that we, in the human condition, can know it. Ultimately, or at least up to this point in time, absolute verification eludes man. At the extreme of this point of view, there are those who claim that truth is not only knowable, but is in fact, known and only the stubborn recalcitrance of the uninitiated prevents it from being generally accepted. This point of view claims not only that morality exists as a discoverable truth, an absolute not fashioned by men but unchanging and immutable, but also that truth has in fact been discovered. Rights and wrongs exist quite apart from the stage on which their application is played out. Situations may differ but, at most, such differences force us to reinterpret old and forever valid principles in a new light. Those who believe themselves to know the truth, furthermore, oftentimes feel compelled not only to persuade others to their point of view but feel morally justified in using considerable force to do so. On the other hand, some of us would deny the existence of immutable truth or, what is not quite the same thing, deny at least that it is knowable in the human condition. Those who flatly deny the existence of unalterable truth find themselves in much the same pickle as do those who flatly assert it: Both lack a standard of truth to which their affirmations can be appealed. Those who concede the possibility that truth exists but not the possibility that man in the human condition can be privy to it, have modified the position without greatly improving it. Their affirmation that man in the human condition can never know absolute truth seems more reasonable but is, once again, not verifiable. Who can know with certainty that tomorrow someone will not discover a way of “getting at” absolute truth and, in addition, be able to provide a simple and brilliant proof which other mortals to date have missed? Only an absolutist could deny such a possibility! That leaves us with a more pragmatic answer: Holding that, in the human condition, truth is not—or at least is not currently—accessible to us leaves more options open and does not fly in the face of the undeniable fact that, unlikely as it seems, our knowing absolute truth may be just around the corner. Outside the religious sphere, no one has ever convinced most thinking people that they are the possessors of absolute truth. Truth, whenever accepted at least for daily use, is invariably hedged. If we accept the fact that absolute truth (at least so far) is unknown to us and accept as an axiom that it may well be unknowable, we are left with a truth which for everyday use is fashioned rather than discovered. What is and what is not true or what is and what is not morally acceptable, therefore, varies with the culture in which we live. This claim (the claim on which, as we shall see, cultural relativism relies) rests on the assertion that there are many ways of looking at truths and that such truths are fashioned by people. Depending on our vantage point, there are many visions of reality,1 a fact which the defenders of this doctrine hold to be valid in dealing with the concrete, scientific reality of chemistry and physics.2 Such a claim, it would seem, is even more forceful when dealing with morals. As Engelhardt puts it so very well: “Our construals of reality exist within the embrace of cultural expectations.”3 And our “construals of reality” include our vision of the moral life. Furthermore, not only do our “visions of reality occur within the embrace of cultural expectations,” the limits of what we as humans can and what we cannot culturally (or otherwise) expect are biologically framed by the totality of our bodies and their capacities as well as (and inseparable from the rest of the body of which it is a part) by our minds. **All human judgments and decisions**, then, **are inevitably grounded to prior assumptions which we accept and do not question for now**. There is a story about William James which illustrates the point. James was giving a lecture dealing with the universe at a Chattauqua: one of those events so popular at the turn of the century, which has, regrettably, been replaced by talk shows. At the end of his well-received lecture, a little old lady came up to him and said: “I enjoyed your talk, Mr. James, but you know you are making an error: The universe rests on the back of a tortoise!” “Very well,” James said, “I can accept that. But tell me, what in turn does that other tortoise rest upon?” “It’s no use, Mr. James, it’s tortoises all the way down.” And so it goes: **Every assumption rests on the back of another assumption and if we are to examine all before proceeding with our everyday judgments and decisions we would get hopelessly mired** in mud. **The quest is necessarily endless. Ethical theories, like all other human activities, inevitably rest on prior assumptions**. Indeed, one cannot reason without a framework of reasoning, and similarly, one cannot reason about reasoning without such a prior framework. The question, it seems, is not the necessary acceptance of an assumption, for that is inevitable, but the depth and universality of the assumption taken. One needs steer between Scylla and Charybdis: on one side too-easy acceptance of a superficial assumption, on the other an endless and almost neurotic quest for ever more basic assumptions. Crashing on the other condemns one to eternal philosophical backpedaling, inactivity, and to leaving the original problem, whose immediate resolution may be critically needed, entirely unresolved. That some framework of reasoning is necessary was recognized by Kant when he claimed that, thanks to the “common structure of our mind,” thought processes inevitably divided the sensible world into categories which we then use to deal with it.4 Rationality requires ways of dealing with the world and reasoning without categories is evidently not possible. The reason why there is no disagreement among persons about some logical propositions is that the common structure of our mind compels us to see certain things in certain ways and to reason along certain lines made inevitable by the very way in which our minds are structured. Even if, later on, we may discover that our universally agreed-upon proposition was wrong, we make this discovery using the same tools. We merely discover that some crucial fact was missing, some critical point not considered. The same basic method of reasoning and the same biological substrate for reasoning (the common structure of our mind) has been used to discover our error. I do not claim that our common biology and the common structure of our minds constitutes a way of discovering absolute truth. What such a common biology and such a common structure imply is that we inevitably will approach problems, see truth, and derive our judgments within such a bodily framework. **We are condemned** (or blessed) **to know the sensible world and to reason from the data presented to us and organized by us in certain and not in other ways. That does not reveal truth to us, but it presents us with a working model to be used, adapted, and learned from.** **The belief that there are no absolutes** (or that, at the very least, they are inaccessible to us in the human condition) **can lead to a moral nihilism in which no firm judgments can be made and no decisions or actions can be undertaken**. Such a moral nihilism claims that truths are fashioned by people and however a person may choose to fashion his truths serves no better than does any other way of constructing truths. The fashioning of truths, in that point of view, lacks its own frame of reference. It does not necessarily follow from this, however, that since our “construals of reality” occur purely within the “embrace of cultural expectations,” all visions of reality that are necessarily of equal worth, or that there are no generally useful standards that we can employ in judging either what we conceive to be physical or ethical reality. One can, for example, claim that some visions of reality are clearly and demonstrably wrong, and support such a claim by empirical observation or by showing that certain visions of reality simply do not work That is the stronger claim. In rejoinder, it can be said that empirical observations and “what works” are themselves part of the framework and that, therefore, such a claim lacks validity. On the other hand, one can make the somewhat weaker claim that certain visions, in the context of a given society and historical epoch, seem less valid than others because they confound careful observation or because they simply fail to work when applied to real situations occurring in real current societies.5 This leaves room for a form of modified cultural relativism. Such a move does not deny that our “visions of reality occur within the embrace of cultural expectations.” But while such a move affirms that there are many realities of similar worth, it also suggests that within the context of such cultural expectations some realities have little, and others have much, validity. **Some realities work** (have explanatory power translatable into action and are, therefore, usable) in the context of our experience and community, while some do not, and some work better than do others. Such a view neither throws up its hands and grants automatic equal worth nor rigidly enforces one view: It **looks upon the problem as one of learning and growth in which realities (both empirical and ethical) are neither rigidly fixed nor entirely subject to ad hoc interpretation**. Ethical certitude, no more than certitude about anything else, is not possible in the human condition. The “ut in pluribus,” the generally and for the most part true of which St. Thomas Aquinas speaks, is the best we can hope for in science as well as in ethics. Since, however, we must inevitably act (nonaction being as much action as action itself), we must be prepared to act on less than complete certitude. Truth cannot, in a Cartesian sense, be expected to be apodictic; rather truth (whether it is scientific or moral truth) is to be worked with, shaped and developed as we experience, learn, and grow.

#### Root cause logic is wrong

**Sharpe**, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University, **‘10**

(Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233)

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth- century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism. Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method Jacques Derrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics, politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of **criticism, as a reductive passing over** the **empirical and analytic distinctness of** the **different** object **fields in complex societies.** In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’ who regularly appear particularly in the English- speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted political contemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also **always in danger of passing over** the **salient differences** and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring at and enacting a wall

(or ‘politically correct screen’) of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology. We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account of absolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower . . . Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a **multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary** critical **theory** that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single- handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifi cally does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be suffi cient ends for a new politics. **It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines**, most of **whom** today **pointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy,** neither reading it nor taking it seriously.